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ABSTRACT:
This paper compares the institutions and goals of the USSR, the EU,
and the CIS to understand the differing origins and competing tenden-
cies of these alternative models of transnational governance. It then
projects those models through history to examine the current relation-
ships of the former Soviet Republics to the EU and the United States.
Understanding the historical sources and development of transna-
tional relations in Eastern Europe will enable better international re-
lations among the EU, the Russian Federation, and the other former
Soviet Republics. This comparison will also help the Russian Federa-
tion and other former Soviet Republics to take up EU models of gov-
ernance where appropriate (most often the case) in order to help
restructure Eastern Europe, and to safeguard peace by increasing eco-
nomic prosperity and interdependence.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The European Union builds peace through interdependence
and prosperity by transferring elements of state sovereignty to inter-
governmental and supranational bodies. An unparalleled success, the
EU presents a model for transnational governance. The EU is the
world’s most advanced and successful example of a pragmatic mixture
of supra-national and intergovernmental governance. It is thus a key
vector of globalization.2 Other regions of the world, such as Eastern
Europe, can emulate its rules and institutions.
This paper compares the institutions and objectives of the
USSR, the EU, and the CIS to understand the differing origins and
competing tendencies of these alternative models of transnational gov-
ernance. Understanding the systemic differences and commonalities of
those models enables the contextualizing of past history, and thus im-
2 See generally Eric Engle, Europe Deciphered: Ideas, Institutions and Laws, 33
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 63, 63-81 (2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1336490 (describing transnational governance within
the EU).
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proves our understanding of current relationships of the former Soviet
Republics to the EU. Hopefully, understanding the historical sources
and development of transnational relations in Eastern Europe will, in
turn, enable better international relations between the EU, the Rus-
sian Federation, and other former Soviet Republics and the United
States.
II. COMPARING TELEOLOGIES OF TRANSNATIONAL
GOVERNANCE: GOALS AND STRUCTURES
Understanding the past helps us appreciate the present and
form the future. First, we compare the goals and structures of the
USSR, the EU, and the CIS. By disaggregating the differing origins
and competing tendencies of these distinct transnational governance
models, we can see their commonalities and the historical breakdowns
in order to foster improved relations by understanding shared goals
and methods used to attain these goals.
A. The Structure and Teleology of the USSR
The USSR was a one-party system. It was a workers’ and peas-
ants’ dictatorship in name,3 directed and led by the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The CPSU regarded itself as a vanguard
party, the most advanced elements (intelligentsia) of the most ad-
vanced class (the proletariat), subject to democratic centralism (open
debate within the party upon the issues, followed by a vote, and then
decisive unanimous action to implement the voted decision with no
further discussion or dissent), and exercising a dictatorship on behalf
of the proletariat (workers and peasants). The party elite of the CPSU
(the “nomenklatura”) claimed to govern on behalf of and for the benefit
of the workers and peasants, i.e. the peoples of the Soviet Union.4 In
western terms, the CPSU was a centralized, hierarchical party of
elites directing a centrally planned economy via dictatorship.  The dic-
tatorship was justified as necessary to work revolutionary changes on
the behalf of the workers and peasants, and, indeed, the initial per-
formance of the USSR was breathtaking. The USSR eradicated illiter-
acy, literally doubled average life expectancy,5 and ended the chronic
3 KONSTITUTSIIA SSSR (1936) [KONST. SSSR][USSR CONSTITUTION] art. 1, trans-
lated in 1936 Constitution of the USSR, BUCKNELL UNIVERSITY (Sept. 7, 2011),
http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/36cons01.html (stating “[t]he
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a socialist state of workers and peasants.”)
[hereinafter USSR CONSTITUTION].
4 A. Nove, Is There a Ruling Class in the USSR?, 27 SOVIET STUDIES 615, 615-16
(Oct. 1975).
5 STEPHEN WHITE, RUSSIA GOES DRY: ALCOHOL, STATE AND SOCIETY 43 (Cambridge
Univ. Press 1996).
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famines endemic of Tsarist Russia. Leninism also instituted sex equal-
ity.6 In these real human terms, Leninism was unquestionably pro-
gress as compared to Tsarism.
Population 1879 1920 1926 1939 1959 1970 1979
Rural M 35.5 52.4 67.3 91.6 99.1 99.6 99.6
12.5 25.2 35.4 76.8 97.5 99.4 99.5
23.8 37.8 50.6 84.0 98.2 99.5 99.6
66.1 80.7 88.0 97.1 99.5 99.9 99.9
45.7 66.7 73.9 90.7 98.1 99.8 99.9
57.0 73.5 80.9 93.8 98.7 99.8 99.9
40.3 57.6 71.5 93.5 99.3 99.8 99.8
16.6 32.3 42.7 81.6 97.8 99.7 99.8











Source: Narodnoe obrazovanie, nauka i kul’tura v SSSR: Statisticheskii shornik (Moscow,
1977, 9; SSSR: zarubezbnye strany, 1987: Statisticheskii sbornik (Moscow, 1988),
83.
The CPSU justified its dictatorship as the best way to obtain
the well-being of the workers and peasants,7 and also as necessary to
help prevent or win any future world war.8 Over time, however, the
Soviet system degenerated, and worked increasingly for the benefit of
the party establishment (the “nomenklatura”)9 at the expense of the
broad masses of workers and peasants. Meanwhile, the threat of inva-
sion diminished. From this perspective, which I call dual delegitima-
tion, we can better understand the sudden, unexpected, and relatively
bloodless restoration of capitalism10 in Russia. The system, in its own
6 See, e.g., GAIL WARSHOFSKY LAPIDUS, WOMEN IN SOVIET SOCIETY: EQUALITY, DE-
VELOPMENT, AND SOCIAL CHANGE 136 (Univ. of Cal. Press 1978).
7 USSR CONSTITUTION, supra note 3 (“The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a
socialist state of the whole people, expressing the will and interests of the workers,
peasants, and intelligentsia, the working people of all the nations and nationali-
ties of the country.”).
8 Id. art. 28.
9 See generally MICHAEL VOSLENSKY, NOMENKLATURA: THE SOVIET RULING CLASS
(Eric Mosbacher trans., Doubleday 1984).
10 Capitalism is a system of economic production predicated on the private owner-
ship of capital. It is distinct from state capitalism wherein the state or public-
private partnerships hold capital. Many define capitalism as an industrial rather
than a feudal mode of production. The Tsarist economy was semi-feudal and in-
dustrializing. Further, many of its economic projects involved heavy state partici-
pation (state capitalism). However, the ownership of capital in the hands of the
financial elite distinguishes Tsarist semi-feudal (state) capitalism from the Soviet
planned economy. Of course, strong state participation in the economy, directly
and indirectly, remains a mark of the Russian economy. However, the post-Soviet
era definitively restored private ownership of capital and the role of the Orthodox
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terms, lost legitimacy as being no longer necessary for defense against
a war that never came. Likewise, the system lost legitimacy because
consumer well-being was simply higher in the west and the nightmare
of Tsarist famine, illiteracy, and inequality was long past. These sys-
temic facts help explain the near bloodless dissolution of the Soviet
system.
Soviet foreign policy was less aggressive than what the U.S.
foreign policy elites, particularly the military, perceived at the time.
Rather than relentlessly seeking to inflame global revolution at every
turn in a zero-sum struggle against the West, the USSR first sought to
build socialism in one country,11 and then in its own sphere of influ-
ence, to construct a stable autarchic system.  The Soviets sought au-
tarchy as the means to self-defense.
Geopolitically, the Soviet system was a series of concentric
rings. The USSR was at the center, then Eastern Europe,12 then Third
World Marxist states, and, finally, Third World non-Marxist allies.
The closer a country was geographically to the Soviet center, the
greater the level of integration into the autarchic economy. Western
efforts to “roll back” Marxism were generally unsuccessful,13 perhaps
because the Soviet system was autarchic. The failure of “roll back” ul-
timately led to the “Brezhnev doctrine,” wherein the USSR declared
the attainment of “socialism” (i.e. single party state capitalism with
worker safeguards) in any country as irreversible.14
To attain autarchic economic development, the USSR imple-
mented an import substitution industrialization (“ISI”) model for eco-
nomic development. ISI had already been used in the West for the
industrialization of the United States and Japan.15 However, the So-
Church as the spiritual guides of the nation. Thus, I refer to this process as “capi-
talist restoration” rather than “capitalist instauration”. See, e.g., STEVEN
ROSEFIELDE, COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC SYSTEMS: CULTURE, WEALTH, AND POWER IN
THE 21ST CENTURY 183 (Blackwell Publishers 2002).
11 Josef Stalin, The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Commu-
nists, Preface to JOSEF V. STALIN, PROBLEMS OF LENINISM 117 (Charles Farrell
trans., Foreign Languages Press, Peking 1976), available at http://
www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1924/12.htm.
12 JOSEPH G. WHELAN & MICHAEL J. DIXON, THE SOVIET UNION IN THE THIRD
WORLD: THREAT TO WORLD PEACE? 8 (Pergamom-Brassey’s Int’l Def. Publishers
1986).
13 See, e.g., PETER GROSE, OPERATION ROLLBACK: AMERICA’S SECRET WAR BEHIND
THE IRON CURTAIN 210 (2000).
14 This policy was known as “The Brezhnev Doctrine.” See generally MATTHEW J.
OUIMET, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE IN SOVIET FOREIGN POL-
ICY (The Univ. of N.C. Press 2003) (explaining the doctrine).
15 See generally DAVID M. TRUBEK & ALVARO SANTOS, THE NEW LAW AND ECO-
NOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (Cambridge Univ. Press 2006)
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viet system’s rationales were the opposite of those of the United
States. The USSR justified its version of ISI through rationales of sub-
stantive equality and solidarity, and contrasted those with the merely
formal freedoms conditioned by economic inequality that justified
western democracies16 some of which were social. Social democracies
provide guaranties of basic well being, especially to workers. Socialist
production in contrast is the state ownership of enterprises, a form of
state capitalism.
Russia’s approach to ISI was, within its own terms, rational.
The Soviet leadership considered obtaining and maintaining the au-
tarchy of the USSR a necessary, legitimate, and attainable goal.17
Given the historical fact that Russia has suffered invasion after inva-
sion, the Soviet goal of economic autarchy as a means to national se-
curity, though definitively economically suboptimal to trade and
international economic integration, was politically justifiable, albeit
increasingly inapt due to sub-optimal economic performance.
Pursuant to the ISI strategy, the USSR created a ruble cur-
rency economic zone, and made the ruble inconvertible.18 Capital re-
strictions were the norm as were border controls, such as customs
duties and passport checks. The policy of autarchy complemented mili-
tary security by enabling independent political choices. Soviet leaders
saw military security as a precondition to economic security and well-
being.19 To circumvent the problem of a lack of foreign currency, the
inability to use the ruble for currency exchanges overseas, and related
problems arising from the nature of a closed economic system, barter
in, and for, real goods was taken up between the COMECON coun-
tries. That practice was known as “countertrade” i.e. cashless goods-
for-goods barter. For example, the USSR would barter with Cuba,
trading sugar for finished Soviet goods.20 Barter also occurred at the
(describing the exposition of the import substitution industrialization model of
development).
16 ERIC ENGLE, MARXISM, LIBERALISM, AND FEMINISM: LEFTIST LEGAL THOUGHT
33-35 (Serials Publ’ns 2010).
17 Ronald A. Francisco, The Foreign Economic Policy of the GDR and the USSR:
The End of Autarky?, in EAST GERMANY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 190 (David
Childs et al. eds., 1989).
18 Vladimir Sobell, Convertibility in the CMEA: The Long Road Ahead, RADIO
FREE EUROPE RESEARCH 4 (Nov. 5, 1987), http://www.osaarchivum.org/files/hold-
ings/300/8/3/pdf/128-5-21.pdf.
19 USSR CONSTITUTION, supra note 3, at art 31.
20 Jose´ F. Alonso & Ralph J. Galliano, Russian Oil-For-Sugar Barter Deals 1989-
1999, in CUBA IN TRANSITION: VOLUME 9, PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINTH
ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR THE STUDY OF THE CUBAN ECONOMY
(ASCE) 335 (1999), available at http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/
volume9/pdfs/alonso.pdf.
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micro-economic level, though not as a legitimate de jure instrument of
state policy, but as a de facto necessity of everyday life, albeit of ques-
tionable legality.21 “Gifts” could be justified as “social” and “fraternal”
acts under the Marxist logic of transforming monetary economic com-
pulsion into cooperative voluntary social acts. With capitalist restora-
tion, however, the primitive version of a “gift economy” warped into
generalized bribery, undermining the rule of law in the post-Soviet
era.22
Preferential tariff treatment for the COMECON and Soviet cli-
ent states was a key feature of the Socialist bloc’s international trade
policy.23 High tariff barriers were created to protect the autarchic
COMECON home market.24 These tariff barriers would also en-
courage infant industries.25 Non-tariff technical barriers such as re-
strictions on imports for health and safety reasons also served the ISI
logic. Meanwhile, intellectual property would be either unprotected or
weakly protected to use Western innovation to support the USSR.26
For example, piracy of Western computer software and microchip tech-
nology was the norm during the Soviet era.27 Intellectual property law
enforcement in Russia remains a sore spot in United States-Russian
21 See, e.g., JIM LEITZEL, RUSSIAN ECONOMIC REFORM 128 (Routledge 1995); see
also Byung-Yeon Kim, Informal Economy Activities of Soviet Households: Size and
Dynamics, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 532, 532-551 (2003).
22 BARBARA WALKER, MAXIMILIAN VOLOSHIN AND THE RUSSIAN LITERARY CIRCLE:
CULTURE AND SURVIVAL IN REVOLUTIONARY TIMES 174 (Ind. Univ. Press 2005).
23 MARIE LAVIGNE, INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY AND SOCIALISM 175 (David
Lambert trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1985). See generally ADAM ZWASS, THE
COUNCIL FOR MUTUAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE: THE THORNY PATH FROM POLITICAL
TO ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (M.E. Sharpe 1989).
24 COMECON (also known as the CMEA) was the USSR’s effort to form a common
market within the Soviet bloc. See, e.g., J. J. BRINE, COMECON: THE RISE AND
FALL OF AN INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST ORGANIZATION xvi (1992).
25 Id.
26 Intellectual property remains weakly protected in the Russian Federation and
the USSR successor states. “[C]ounterfeiting and piracy activity in Russia remains
on a high level. The lack of effective enforcement affects Russian markets on a
large scale. To be fully integrated in the world trading system, to continue to at-
tract foreign investment and to prevent major losses for right-holders, Russia has
to implement all its international obligations, in particular the ones related to In-
tellectual Property Rights and their Enforcement.” Directorate-General for Trade,
Intellectual Property: Dialogues, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Aug. 22, 2011), http://
ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/trade-topics/intellectual-property/dia-
logues/#_russia.
27 See, e.g., Shane Hart, Computing in the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Eu-
rope, 5 CROSSROADS 23, 23-25 (Mar. 1999).
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relations to this day.28   Most importantly, the centrally-planned econ-
omy’s taxing and subsidization systems aimed to accumulate the sur-
plus capital needed for economic development through the creation of
infrastructure (e.g., housing, roads, airports) via forced saving29 and
also, ominously, for military production.
The political and legal institutions in the USSR and its satel-
lites paralleled those of the West. Legal and institutional parallels in-
cluded: the Warsaw Treaty Organization (the Warsaw Pact), which
paralleled the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO);30 the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON, also known as
CMEA), for its part, paralleled the European Economic Community
(EEC).31 Other parallels could be found fairly readily and, in my opin-
ion, Soviet socialist legalism should be seen as a variant of civilianist
law.
Legal and political parallels arose because each system sought
the same goals (economic development, technical progress, national se-
curity) albeit by somewhat different methods and justified by differing
rationales. The Soviet system was an authoritarian egalitarian vari-
ant of late modernity that sought to attain economic development us-
ing the Western import substitution industrialization (ISI) model.32
The Soviet systemic rationales were substantive equality and social
solidarity; the West’s were freedom, property and individual rights.
These rationales also served as principles for organizing production
and social life generally.
The Soviets, like the West, sought the same goals: to obtain a
better life for workers (the people) and physical (military) security (i.e.,
defense). The means to those ends, however, differed. The USSR
sought to obtain prosperity not through the capitalist anarchy of pro-
duction but through centralized economic planning.33 Similarly, the
USSR sought to attain security through autarchy (isolation and inde-
pendence) rather than through economic interdependence.34 Economic
28 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE: RUSSIA (Aug. 28, 2011), http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3183.htm.
29 See generally Eric Engle, A Social-Market Economy for Rapid Sustainable De-
velopment, 2 J.L. DEV. & POL. 42, 42-62 (2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1424695 (explaining the ISI model in the context of
Soviet development theory).
30 Malcome Byrne & Vojtech Mastny, The Warsaw Pact, Gone with a Whimper,
N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 14, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/13/opinion/13iht-
edbyrne.html.
31 See BRINE, supra note 24.
32 Engle, A Social-Market, supra note 29, at 43.
33 Id.
34 Id.
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interdependence was the path to peace the West took, as the EU and
WTO exemplify.35
The Soviet economy’s key problem was the fact that it was de-
fined around building up a military-industrial complex to fight and
win a World War III if ever attacked again: autarchy as a means to
security.36 Tragically,37 in pursuit of its military defense, the USSR
and its Warsaw Pact allies wasted almost all their surplus production
on unproductive military spending.38 Ultimately, the United States re-
sponse to the failure of rollback and the Brezhnev doctrine was to com-
pete in fields where the USSR could not compete due to technological
inferiority or due to the structure of a closed dictatorship. The United
States’ own arms buildup aimed to bankrupt the USSR by forcing it
into an unsustainable arms race, a policy that worked.39 The resulting
economic strains led to constant shortages that seriously undercut the
USSR’s claim to be creating a workers’ paradise with the highest stan-
dard of living for ordinary people on earth.40 The USSR was under-
mined by economic dislocations, the inability of the planned economy
to deliver high quality goods to the most needed areas on time, and due
to the increasing strain of militarism. “The party of Lenin,” despite
such stunning initial success, was ultimately unable to match capital-
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Recall that tragedy, strictly speaking, means the inevitable downfall of a hero
(or anti-hero) due to his excess of virtue. In the Soviet Union “defense of the moth-
erland” taken to its excess became paranoia, crippling production and dooming the
system to (inevitable) collapse. However, the West did not win the cold war;
rather, the Soviets lost it.
38 Russian Military Budget, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG (Aug. 25, 2011), http://
www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/mo-budget.htm (“By the mid-1980s,
the Soviet Union devoted between 15 and 17 percent of its annual gross national
product to military spending, . . . Until the early 1980s, Soviet defense expendi-
tures rose between 4 and 7 percent per year.”); see also ANDERS A˚SLUND, BUILDING
CAPITALISM: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FORMER SOVIET BLOC 131 (2001).
39 Kremlinology often focuses on budget questions. See, e.g., Bill Keller, Soviet
Budget Deficits Are Disclosed By Kremlin; Wasteful Subsidies Blamed, N.Y. TIMES,
(Oct. 28, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/10/28/world/big-soviet-budget-defi-
cits-are-disclosed-by-kremlin-wasteful-subsidies-blamed.html; see also Timothy
Sosnovy, The Soviet Military Budget, 42 FOREIGN AFF. 487, 487-94 (1964), availa-
ble at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/23604/timothy-sosnovy/the-soviet-
military-budget.
40 See, e.g., 31 V. I. LENIN, COLLECTED WORKS 516 (1966) (stating “Communism is
Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country.” That is, the Soviet sys-
tem justified itself as the fastest route to development, which it was for at least
one generation. However, ultimately, the system lost legitimacy as it became clear
and clearer that the west produced better quality consumer goods and in greater
numbers).
558 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 10:4
ism in the quality and abundance of consumer goods.41 This, coupled
with the increasing tendency of the nomenklatura to serve its own
goals rather than to seek the well-being of all the Soviet peoples, and
the fact that the U.S., unlike Nazi Germany, was not threatening to
invade the USSR to seize resources, led to a crisis of purpose, of legiti-
macy, and a capitalist restoration.
B. The Objectives of the EU
The EU aims to form a single, integrated European market to:
(1) break the link between territory and trade which drove Europe into
at least two global wars; and (2) generate the prosperity through trade
that results from specialization in production, economies of scale, and
reduced transaction costs.42 At one extreme, Euro-Federalists have
cautiously and tentatively argued for the formation of a “United States
of Europe.”43 The Euro-Federalists’ ultimate goal is both unrealistic
and undesirable - recreating mercantilist nation states as mercantilist
continental empires would only lead to more global conflict.44
Good, practical reasons, however, validated the EU’s creation.
The EU’s objectives, also (and more importantly) included preventing
another European war and improving the well-being of all workers.45
Those objectives were attained through the functionalist method of
forming specialized institutions defined around particular goals to
take advantage of unbiased expert judgment. This expert judgment in
specific sectors in turn enabled the EU to attain socially desirable
goals in the common interest of all Europeans in an incremental step-
by-step fashion. The functionalist method first pooled together the mil-
itary industries: coal, steel, and atomic power via the European Coal
41 See ALEX F. DOWLAH & JOHN E. ELLIOTT, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF SOVIET SO-
CIALISM 182 (1997).
42 Engle, Europe Deciphered, supra note 2, at 65.
43 See, e.g., EURO-POLITICS: INSTITUTIONS AND POLICYMAKING IN THE “NEW” EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITY 260 (Alberta M. Sbragia ed., 1992).
44 Eric Engle, The EU Means Business: A Survey of Legal Challenges and Oppor-
tunities in the New Europe, 4 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 351, 352-53 (2006), availa-
ble at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 1020467.
45 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11, available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/docu-
ments/treaties/rometreaty2.pdf [hereinafter Treaty of Rome]. The Treaty of Rome
was succeeded by the Treaty of Amsterdam (Maastricht) and then the Treaty of
Lisbon which reiterated those goals: “The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its val-
ues and the well-being of its peoples.” Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on
European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community art.2, Dec.
13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1, available at http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/in-
dex_en.htm [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon].
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and Steel Community (ECSCE)46 and the European Atomic Energy
Community (EURATOM).47 European states also formed a customs
union, the European Economic Community (EEC) to disaggregate na-
tional cartels, which were seen as a cause of wars for market share,
because trade and territory had been linked and as a result the only
way any state could expand its economy and resource base was by
war.48 Thus, the customs union aimed to attain a single integrated
market via the free movement of goods, workers, capital, and enter-
prises (the four freedoms). Ultimately, the EU evolved into a suprana-
tional body with a common currency (the Euro), common citizenship
and passports, common borders (the Schengen Area), and to some ex-
tent, a common foreign and security policy.49 As a confederation,50 the
EU began to share many elements of classical Westphalian nation-
states.51
C. The Objectives of the CIS
The CIS arose in the chaotic aftermath of the collapse of the
USSR, which saw competing concerns hamper political movements to-
ward cooperative relations in the former Soviet states.52 Unlike the
46 See EUROPEAN UNION, TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL
COMMUNITY (Aug. 29, 2011), http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_
affairs/treaties/treaties_ecsc_en.htm (explaining that the ECSCE merged into the
E.U.).
47 See generally The European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), EURO-
PEAN COMM’N (Aug. 25, 2011), http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/euratom/
euratom_en.htm (indicating that the EURATOM’s Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC) maintains a separate legal existence as an international organization).
48 Namely, the unity of trade and territory under the Westphalian state system
led to war because any state which wished to expand its economy also had to ex-
pand its territory. See, e.g., Eric Engle, Europe Deciphered, supra note 2, at 63.
49 See generally Eric Engle, I Am My Own Worst Enemy: Problems and Possibili-
ties of European Foreign Policy Vis-a-Vis the United States,18 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
737,  737-38 (2006).
50 See, e.g., Eric Engle, Theseus’s Ship of State: Confederated Europa between the
Scylla of Mere Alliance and the Charybdis of Unitary Federalism, 8 FLA. COASTAL
L. REV. 27, 28-30 (2006).
51 See Eric Engle, The Transformation of the International Legal System: The
Post-Westphalian Legal Order, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 23, 23-25 (2004).
52 See Michael Roberts & Peter Wehrheim, Regional Trade Agreements and WTO
Accession of CIS Countries, 36 INTERECONOMICS 315, 315 (2001), available at
http://www.springerlink.com/content/41642065037ll 583/ (“Shortly after the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union most of its successor states, with the exception of the
Baltic States, joined the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). At the same
time many CIS countries opened up their trade regimes by dismantling various
trade restrictions, state trading monopolies, multiple exchange rate regimes as
well as formal tariff barriers. However, in the course of the 1990s pressure for the
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USSR or the EU, the CIS never had well-articulated goals.  While one
faction of the former Russian nomenklatura may well have seen the
CIS as the Soviet Union by other means, another faction of Russians,
comprised of those who had been the former economic criminals, may
well have seen the CIS as merely a vast economic opportunity.53 Even
presupposing the unity of Russian nationalist leaders, the fact that
such unity centered on “great Russian nationalism” rather than “prole-
tarian internationalism” indicates that the CIS’s centralizing tenden-
cies were disunited and unattractive to the newly independent
national states. On the part of the CIS leaders, this indicates disunity
of factions and of objectives. Nevertheless, even if there were a unity, if
only of great Russian factions and objectives, then that unitary vision
was not able to attract adhesion or persuade the newly independent
national republics in, e.g. former Soviet Central Asia, to help form
some variant of confederation featuring a customs union and/or com-
mon currency and/or common defense.54
The lack of a compelling and attractive central vision of shared
goals and objectives for the CIS crippled it as an institution for trans-
national governance. Absent a common teleology or purpose, the CIS
protection of domestic industries has increased. Import tariffs on ”sensitive im-
ports“, such as refined sugar, have started to pop up. By far the most serious barri-
ers to trade and the ones most frequently used are non-tariff barriers. The ever
more complex and constantly changing trade regimes of many CIS countries have
also opened the door for corruption and smuggling.”).
53 See Theodore P. Gerber, Membership Benefits or Selection Effects? Why Former
Communist Party Members Do Better in Post-Soviet Russia, 29 SOCIAL SCIENCE
RESEARCH 25, 47 (2000) (“It seems likely that such individual attributes as ambi-
tion, career-mindedness, a willingness to submit to organizational discipline, a
penchant for organizational and administrative work, and perhaps what might be
termed ‘opportunism’ may characterize Party members.  These attributes are just
as readily translated into material advantage in market institutional contexts as
in the institutional context of the Soviet Union.”); Frederico Varese, The Transi-
tion to the Market and Corruption in Post–socialist Russia, 45 POLI. STUDIES 579,
594 (1997) (“It is harder to secure property right in the new market economy be-
cause the number of criminal opportunities is immense. . .People have had novel
opportunities to cooperate and, at the same time, to defect, to cheat, and to commit
crimes.”).
54 See STEPHAN K. BATALDEN & SANDRA L. BATALDEN, THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT
STATES OF EURASIA: HANDBOOK OF FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS 18 (1997) (consider-
ing factional conflict within the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic at
the outset of the CIS); see also SCOTT L. GREER, QUESTIONING GEOPOLITICS: POLITI-
CAL PROJECTS IN A CHANGING WORLD-SYSTEM 216-17 (2000) (noting the factional-
ism prevalent within the nomenklatura); Boris Grushin, The Emergence of a New
Elite: Harbinger of the Future or Vestige of the Past, in THE NEW ELITE IN POST-
COMMUNIST EASTERN EUROPE 53, 57 (Vladimir Shlapentokh et al. eds., 1999) (dis-
cussing the lack of vision prevalent in CIS elites).
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degenerated into the political overseer of the peaceful dissolution of
the USSR55 and, to a limited extent, the introduction of market mech-
anisms to replace the planned economic system. Consequently, in
Western literature the CIS is typically described as “moribund” and
can accurately be compared to the present day British
Commonwealth.56
1. The Breakdown of the CIS
The CIS failed to evolve into a viable transnational governing
institution due to a lack of a common vision57 and elite inexperience in
transnational institutionalism,58 particularly with regards to market
liberalization.59 The CIS sought to undertake the simultaneous tasks
of privatization, political and economic liberalization, and the imple-
mentation of the rule of law to replace rule-by-command.  However,
the CIS lacked experts and practical proficiency in transnational gov-
ernance beyond the context of a strong vertical hierarchy of a one-
party dictatorship.  Consequently, liberal western transnational gov-
ernance models such as those of the European Communities could not
inform the CIS’s already overwhelmed managerial class. Moreover,
some of the new managerial class were Soviet era “economic
55 See Roberts & Wehrheim, supra note 52, at 323 (“Ten years after the break up
of the USSR, CIS countries are still struggling to find the appropriate format to
govern their mutual trade relations. At present a patchwork of half-implemented
bilateral agreements and a series of paper framework agreements govern intra-
CIS trade relations. Most of the RTAs among CIS member states remain de jure
agreements. If one were to characterise this institutional framework, one might
term it ‘managed disintegration’.”).
56 See Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), GLOBALSECURITY.ORG (Aug. 24,
2011), http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/cis.htm.
57 See Rilka Dragneva & Joop de Kort, Russia’s Role in Fostering the CIS Trade
Regime, Memorandum from the Dept. of Econ. Research of Leiden University 9
(Mar. 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1440809 (“The CIS was bur-
dened with ambivalent goals. On the one hand, it aimed to assist the newly inde-
pendent countries to gain economic independence, while on the other hand it was
the intended institution to bring the newly independent states together in an eco-
nomic union. The ambivalent character of the CIS, and the increasing self-con-
sciousness, both politically and economically, of the newly independent states,
resulted in numerous bilateral and multilateral agreements at the same time.”).
58 See Margot Light, International Relations of Russia and the Commonwealth of
Independent States, in 1999 EASTERN EUROPE AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDE-
PENDENT STATES 21 (4th ed.1999).
59 See Philip Hanson, The Economics of the Former USSR: An Overview, in 1999
EASTERN EUROPE AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES 74, 79 (4th ed.
1998).
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criminals,”60 while others were former nomenklatura. Consequently,
factionalism soon ensued both between and within these two histori-
cally conflicting groups. The CIS’s failure is unsurprising, and was
perhaps even inevitable, given those conditions.61 Lacking a common
vision, the CIS defaulted into the role of the clearinghouse for the
USSR’s remarkably peaceful dissolution via two distinct factors: (i)
privatization; and (ii) the devolution of former federal powers to indi-
vidual Republics.62
The institutional problems mentioned contributed to the break-
down of CIS. For example, the CIS’s transnational trade policy was
characterized by incoherence. Numerous overlapping multilateral and
bilateral treaties covered similar issues,63 leading to economic dis-
putes due to the contradictory obligations imposed by the various trea-
ties.64  However, these overlapping multilateral and bilateral treaties
also left many issues unaddressed.65 For example, the CIS’ agree-
ments were not sophisticated enough to take into account non-tariff
60 See Leonard Orland, Perspectives on Soviet Economic Crime, in SOVIET LAW AND
ECONOMY 169, 177-78 (Olimpiad S. Ioffe & Mark W. Janis eds.) (1987) (outlining
what defined a Soviet-era economic criminal). See generally Charles A. Schwartz,
Economic Crime in the USSR: A Comparison of the Khrushchev and Brezhnev
Eras, 30 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 281, 295 (1981) (discussing the scaling back of the
rigidity of economic rules allowing more economic freedom).
61 Nonetheless, its failure was remarkable in that it contributed to the peaceful
transition from one-party dictatorships to independent republics with varying de-
grees of democratic participatory government.
62 See Stephen Kux, From the USSR to the Commonwealth of Independent States:
Confederation or Civilized Divorce, in FEDERALIZING EUROPE? 325, 346-347 (Joa-
chim Jens Hesse &Vincent Wright eds. 1996).
63 “What can be observed in the CIS is that economic cooperation takes the form of
overlapping bilateral and multilateral agreements of very distinct legal quality.
From an economic point of view it does not make sense that countries that have
concluded a multilateral free trade agreement, as the CIS countries did in 1994,
an agreement that they amended in 1999, subsequently conclude bilateral free
trade agreements with their partners as well. It creates overlap, increases trans-
action costs, and obfuscates the status of multilateral and bilateral agreements.”
See Dragneva & de Kort, supra note 57, at 1.
64 Id. (“What can be observed in the CIS is that economic cooperation takes the
form of overlapping bilateral and multilateral agreements of very distinct legal
quality. From an economic point of view it does not make sense that countries that
have concluded a multilateral free trade agreement, as the CIS countries did in
1994, an agreement that they amended in 1999, subsequently conclude bilateral
free trade agreements with their partners as well. It creates overlap, increases
transaction costs, and obfuscates the status of multilateral and bilateral
agreements.”).
65 See id. (“The agreements that are concluded often are partial and selective,
while their ratification and implementation also is a mixed affair.”).
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trade barriers such as health, safety, and technical restrictions to
trade.66 In sum, CIS institutions and rules were simply ineffective.
Any effort to bring the USSR’s customs and monetary union
into the CIS era was thus doomed for several interlocking reasons.
The absence of legal concepts important to coordinating supranational
and intergovernmental tendencies and attaining by accretion the
objectives of economic integration—such as “basic economic rights”
(the four freedoms)67 subsidiarity, proportionality, and acquired com-
munity positions (acquis communautaire68)—within the CIS treaties
further crippled the CIS. Common institutions such as the Economic
Court of the CIS were weak or entirely absent69 because of a lack of a
common will, common goals, and common concepts.
Although the CIS lacked the institutional expertise and juridi-
cal structure to transform the USSR into something like the EEC, this
does not mean that it is currently impossible or undesirable. Accord-
ingly, this paper considers the Eurasian Economic Community
66 See id. at 3 (“The CIS trade regime can be described as a symbiosis between
bilateral and multilateral regimes, both of which can be described as weak re-
gimes. Bilateral agreements cover some key free trade rules, such as tariffs, but
remain minimal and quite basic. Non-tariff barriers, for instance, are generally
left out, as are liberalisation of services or intellectual property to name a few
issues that have become important in international trade agreements. Disputes
are generally resolved through consultations”).
67 The central concept to the foundation of the European Union as an economic
area are the four freedoms (basic rights): the free movement of goods, workers,
capital and of enterprises among the Member States. See, e.g., Engle, Europe Deci-
phered, supra note 2.
68 Knud Erik Jørgensen, The Social Construction of the Acquis Communautaire: A
Cornerstone of the European Edifice, 3 EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ONLINE PAPERS 1,
3, 10-12 (Apr. 29, 1999), http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1999-005a.htm (using the
Nietzsche-Foucauldian genealogical method to explore various definitions of ac-
quis communautaire); Acquis Communautaire, BBC NEWS (Apr. 30, 2001), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/europe/euro-glossary/1216329.stm.
69 Dragneva & de Kort, supra note 57, at 2 (“[T]he CIS presents a mix of, often
overlapping, bilateral and multilateral agreements. The picture gets even more
complicated as bilateral and multilateral agreements often differ in the strength of
commitment they require from the signatories. Bilateral agreements rarely envi-
sion a mechanism for resolving disputes between its parties, relying on negotia-
tions to do so. Multilateral agreements on the other hand often do attempt to
strengthen the bindingness of the commitments undertaken. In 1993, the Treaty
of the Economic Union even went as far as to strengthen the role of the Economic
Court, by requiring that ‘if the Economic Court recognises that [. . .] a member
state has not fulfilled its obligation ensuing from the Treaty, this state is obliged
to take measures connected with the implementation of the decision of the Eco-
nomic Court’. A year later, in 1994, a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) was concluded
which ‘undermines’ the position of the Economic Court. . .”).
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(EurAsEC) to see whether and how the CIS may consider and imple-
ment EU principles.
2. The Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC)70
Following the instauration of market mechanisms to replace
the planned economic system, and because of the EU’s continual suc-
cess as an institution of transnational governance, the Russian Feder-
ation, Belarus, and Kazakhstan together instituted a customs union
known as the “Eurasian Economic Community.”71 The EurAsEC
could, and should, look directly to the EU’s growth and evolution as a
source of inspiration and also for basic legal concepts such as:
Direct effect of treaty provisions (that private persons have di-
rectly enforceable rights and duties under the EurAsEC treaty).
The four freedoms (free movement of goods, labor capital, work-
ers and enterprises)72
Acquis communautaire (the idea that each step toward a single
integrated market is irreversible, and that new adherents to the
EurAsEC must agree to abide by the existing acquis)73
“General principles of international law” as a source of
EurAsEC law
The principle of legality (that EurAsEC institutions should be
legal, not political)
Functionalism (that the EurAsEC institutions should be built
out incrementally to progressively attain a single integrated market)
Economic development occurs more quickly through open bor-
ders.74 Thus, despite critiques of the rule of law and democracy in the
former Soviet republics, the path forward is through free trade. Eco-
70 About EurAsEC, EBPAC¸E`E´CKOE Y´KOHOME`?ECKOE COOA´U`ECTBO (Aug. 24, 2011),
http://www.evrazes.com/en/about (“[A] customs union within the EurAsEC
framework, with the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan and the
Russian Federation as initial members. Other EurAsEC member states will join
the customs union when their economies are ready to take this step.”).
71 Roberts & Wehrheim, supra note 52, at 321 (“Russia and two other CIS coun-
tries - Kazakhstan and Belarus - established a customs union (CU) in 1995. The
Kyrgyz Republic joined in March 1996 and Tajikistan in 1999. The text of the
customs provided for discontinuation of all trade tariffs between member coun-
tries, tariffs for trade with other countries were adjusted to one level, [i.e., harmo-
nized into a common external tariff] and the system of privileges was unified. In
addition, certain measures were taken to unify tax policy (tax rates and applica-
tion of indirect taxes). The agreements on the customs union called for coordina-
tion of customs, excise, and value-added dues.”).
72 See, e.g., Engle, Europe Deciphered, supra note 2, at 75.
73 See Jørgensen, supra note 68, at 3.
74 CLEMENS L. J. SIERMANN, POLITICS, INSTITUTIONS, AND THE ECONOMIC PERFORM-
ANCE OF NATIONS 131 (Edward Elgar Publ’g 1998).
2011] FROM RUSSIA WITH LOVE 565
nomic development is the most practical and effective way to build
stronger and more democratic institutions in the former Soviet Repub-
lics because wealth creates the conditions that enable genuine human
rights protection.75 The authoritarian democracies in the former So-
viet Republics are not systematic violators of the most basic human
rights.76
Functionalist incrementalism is thus more effective than ex-
treme methods at securing human rights protection.77 Economic inte-
gration resulting from freer trade and improved economic performance
are positively correlated.78 Likewise, improved economic performance
and improved human rights protection are positively correlated.79
Consequently, through a constructive engagement policy,80 aid and
75 Nat’l Intelligence Council, Conference Report, Russia in the International Sys-
tem (June 1, 2001), http://www.dni.gov/nic/confreports_russiainter.html (“Living
in the post-Cold War era has lent some air of stability—a peace dividend—to life
in Russia. This may have a positive effect on the development of the economy and
democratic institutions.”).
76 Eleanor Bindman, Russia’s Response to the EU’s Human Rights Policy,
OPENDEMOCRACY.NET (Oct. 1, 2010), http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/el-
eanor-bindman/russia%E2%80%99s-response-to-eu%E2%80%99s-human-rights-
policy (“[T]he election of President Medvedev in 2008 has led to gradual changes in
the previously more hard-line policy regarding human rights in EU-Russia rela-
tions. The new foreign policy doctrine appears to emphasise less confrontational
and more pragmatic relations with partners such as the EU with the aim of pro-
moting Russia’s modernisation.”); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 2011 WORLD REPORT
456, 460, 462 (2011), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/world-report-2011/russia
(“In 2010 Russia demonstrated increased openness to international cooperation on
human rights . . .
In January 2010 - after years of delay - Russia ratified Protocol 14 to the Euro-
pean Convention for Human Rights, becoming the last Council of Europe (CoE)
member state to do so. Protocol 14 streamlines the case review process at the
ECtHR and strengthens the enforcement mechanisms of the CoE’s Committee of
Ministers. . . .
In 2010 Russia showed some improved cooperation on human rights, but Rus-
sia’s international partners did not do enough to encourage human rights
reform.”).
77 Elena Klitsounova, Promoting Human Rights in Russia by Supporting NGOs:
How to Improve EU Strategies 19 (Ctr. for European Policies Studies, Working
Document, No. 19, Apr. 2008), available at www.ceps.be/system/ files/book/
1637.pdf.
78 See, e.g., U.N. Econ. & Soc. Comm’n for W. Asia, Assessment of Trade Policy
Trends and Implications for the Economic Performance of the ESCWA Region, at 3,
U.N. Doc E/ESCWA/EDGD/2009/1 (Apr. 14, 2009), available at http://www.escwa.
un.org/information/publications/edit/upload/edgd-09-1-e.pdf.
79 SIERMANN, supra note 74, at 131.
80 Sanford J. Ungar & Peter Vale, South Africa: Why Constructive Engagement
Failed, 64 FOREIGN AFF. 234 (Winter 1985/86) (defining constructive engagement),
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trade can help improve economic well-being, leading to both improved
human rights protection, and improved rule of law within the former
Soviet Republics.
Supranational and intergovernmental governance worked well
in the EU to leverage Member States and their immediate neighbors
out of war.81 The former Soviet Republics can and should use those
same methods – economic integration leading to increased prosperity
to foster peace and the progressive realization of human rights82 –to
support the rule of law and human rights protection.83 Free trade gen-
erates economic prosperity, which in turn generates improved human
rights protection.84 Thus, free trade improves human rights
protection.
3. Comparing CIS and EU institutions
Marx demonstrated that the business cycle of booms, panics,
and depressions causes wars to obtain markets and raw materials as
well as to burn off surplus production and employ the unemployed.85
available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/40525/sanford-j-ungar-and-pe-
ter-vale/south-africa-why-constructive-engagement-failed.
81 See, e.g, PAUL CRAIG & GRA´INNE DE BU´RCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERI-
ALS 3-6 (2008).
82 Sˇtefan Fu¨le, Address at Columbia University (Aug. 25, 2011), http://
www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/fr/article_10447_fr.htm.
83 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Living With Russia, 61 THE NATIONAL INTEREST 5, 5 (Fall
2000) (“Both Russia and China may be susceptible to a strategy aimed at their
inclusion in cooperative international structures. To that end, two Eurasian power
triangles must be steadily managed and, over time, more directly connected: one
involving the United States, the European Union and Russia; and the other in-
volving the United States, Japan and China. For that linkage to be effective, the
constructive engagement of Russia is essential.“); Jonathan M. Winer & Phil Wil-
liams, Russian Crime and Corruption in an Era of Globalization: Implications for
the United States, in RUSSIA’S UNCERTAIN FUTURE, S. PRT. 107-5, at 97, 121 (Joint
Comm. Print 2001), available at http://econ.la.psu.edu/~bickes/jecrussia.pdf (”Fol-
lowing the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ascendancy of Boris Yeltsin, U.S.
policy could be defined in brief as one of constructive engagement, in which the
United States aggressively and assiduously worked to secure Russian integration
with the world economy, Russian political, economic and legal reform, and democ-
ratization.“); see Graham Timmins, German-Russian Bilateral Relations and EU
Policy on Russia: Reconciling the Two-Level Game?, in RUSSIA AND EUROPE IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: AN UNEASY PARTNERSHIP 169-70 (Jackie Gower & Gra-
ham Timmins  eds., 2009) (describing diplomatic tensions between a post-Putin
CIS and the European Union).
84 See SIERMANN, supra 74, at 131; Fu¨le, supra note 82.
85 KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 11 (The Echo
Library 2009) (1888).
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Both the EU86 and the USSR sought to prevent such wars and to at-
tain well-being for ordinary workers. However, their similar teleologi-
cal goals were to be attained by differing means.  Institutionally, the
USSR was, at least nominally, a workers’ and peasants’ dictatorship:
an advanced vanguard party would exercise a dictatorship on behalf of
the proletariat87  to prevent88  the wars for market share that capital-
ism unleashed in economic crises at the trough of business cycles.89
While we might criticize the idea of a vanguard party exercising a dic-
tatorship on behalf of workers and peasants, we should also under-
stand that the USSR’s proletarian dictatorship shared the same stated
objectives as the EU. Paradoxally, the EU and USSR both sought to
transform the state (coercion) into society (voluntarism), but through
opposite means. The USSR, following Marx’s prescription to transform
the state into civil society,90 sought to end market relations entirely91
to attain the goal of peace and prosperity. The EU sought to use mar-
ket forces to attain that same goal.92
Like the EU, the USSR was multinational, multilingual, and
attained a monetary union with the free movement of goods, labor, and
capital.  But, the USSR did not in fact attain the best standard of liv-
ing for workers.  Life expectancy was only a few years lower than in
86 See, e.g., DAMIAN CHALMERS ET AL., EUROPEAN UNION LAW: CASES AND MATERI-
ALS 7 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2010).
87 See generally PETER BU¨RGER, THEORY OF THE AVANT-GARDE (Michael Shaw
trans., Univ. of Minn. Press 1984).
88 See VLADIMIR ILYICH LENIN, IMPERIALISM, THE HIGHEST STAGE OF CAPITALISM
(1916), reprinted in 1 LENIN: SELECTED WORKS 667 (Progress Publishers 1963),
available at http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/imp-hsc/ch09.htm.
89 See 1 KARL MARX, CAPITAL (Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling trans., Frederick
Engles ed., 1867), available at http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-
c1/; 2 KARL MARX, CAPITAL (I. Lasker trans., Progress Publisher 1956) (1885),
available at http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1885-c2/index.htm; 3
KARL MARX, CAPITAL (Tim Delaney et al. trans., 1999) (1894), available at http://
www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Capital-Volume-III.pdf; see
also VLADIMIR ILYICH LENIN, STATE AND REVOLUTION (1917), in 25 Collected Works
381-492, available at http://marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/staterev/in-
dex.htm; MARX & ENGELS, supra note 85, at ch. 2.
90 FRIEDRICH ENGELS & KARL MARX, SOCIALISM: UTOPIAN AND SCIENTIFIC 68 (An-
drew Moore ed., Edward Aveling trans., Mondial 2006).
91 See, e.g., USSR CONSTITUTION, supra note 3, at art. 4 (“The socialist system of
economy and the socialist ownership of the means and instruments of production
firmly established as a result of the abolition of the capitalist system of economy,
the abrogation of private ownership of the means and instruments of production
and the abolition of the exploitation of man by man, constitute’ the economic foun-
dation of the U.S.S.R. 1936.”).
92 See, e.g., Treaty of Rome, supra note 45, at pmbl.
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the West but double that of Tsarist Russia.93 Leisure was assured, but
consumer goods were always in short supply.94 The quality of goods
suffered from production deadlines at the end of the five-year planning
cycles when production goals had to be met, though this improved over
time.95 However, in sum, the quality of Soviet life did not match West-
ern European standards. This was mostly because so much of the gov-
ernment’s resources were wasted on building a military-industrial
complex that did not advance the well-being of Soviet citizens.96
Moreover, the planned economy faced an increasingly complex
task: the centralized coordination of production and distribution of a
growing variety of goods.97  Central planning of a primitive industrial-
izing economy with only a few basic inputs is considerably easier than
for a diversified industrial economy with hundreds of consumer goods.
The Soviet planned economy succeeded in shifting the USSR from a
semi-feudal economy producing but a score of basic goods into an in-
dustrial economy.98  This newly created industrial economy, however,
produced a myriad of different goods.99 This production diversity
doomed the centrally planned economy. Namely, the ever-greater
product variety made central planning increasingly complex and thus
less efficient when coordinating production and consumption.  Soviet
production was not, however, entirely inefficient.  Soviet weaponry
was cheap, durable, easily maintained and reliable.  The USSR was
the first country to put a satellite into space, and later a man into
orbit.  Still, the USSR’s centrally planned economic production system
was more appropriate for a semi-feudal industrializing society with
few goods than for a highly developed industrial economy producing a
myriad of goods.100
The institution of a single party dictatorship and the teleology
of the USSR were not apt to liberalism.101 Thus, the customs and mon-
93 WHITE, supra note 5, at 43.
94 See generally Robert Whitesell, Why Does the Soviet Economy Appear to be Allo-
catively Efficient?, 42 SOVIET STUDIES 259, 259-268 (Apr. 1990).
95 Zigurds L. Zile, Consumer Product Quality in Soviet Law: The Tried and the
Changing, in 2 SOVIET LAW AFTER STALIN: SOCIAL ENGINEERING THROUGH LAW 202
(Donald D. Barry ed., 1978) (discussing the rising quality of Soviet goods between
1960s and 1970s).
96 See Engle, A Social-Market, supra note 29, at 42.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Engle, A Social-Market, supra note 29.
100 See generally Ludwig von Mises, Introduction to LUDWIG VON MISES, ECO-
NOMIC CALCULATION IN THE SOCIALIST COMMONWEALTH 2, 2-3 (S. Alder trans.,
1920), available at http://mises.org/econcalc.asp.
101 I mean liberalism in the sense intended by Aristotle and Locke; an open demo-
cratic form of governance in which people are free to enter into economic transac-
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etary union of the CIS quickly degenerated into national economies
with separate currencies and tariff barriers still trying to implement
the ISI development model – a model that neoliberalism had long sur-
passed.102 The establishment of inter CIS customs and tariff barriers
raised transaction costs and reduced economies of scale.103  Restruc-
turing a centrally planned dictatorial economy centered on autarchy
and war into a consumer oriented networked globalizing economy ex-
acerbated those problems. The result was sub-optimal economic per-
formance.104 At times, the newly independent Republics were trying to
implement outdated and inefficient liberal or Soviet models of eco-
nomic development. At other times, they became disposable experi-
ments in neoliberalism. All too often the results were chaos,
corruption, asset stripping, and economic failure105 resulting in a de-
clining average life expectancy in the post-Soviet years.106 These re-
sults explain why multiparty liberal democracy did not take root in
some of the former Soviet Republics. The return of one-party rule in
some former Soviet Republics after the collapse of the USSR resulted
from the chaos of the failed Soviet planned economy model, the failed
ISI model, and the asset stripping and kleptocracy which resulted
from neoliberal experimentation.  The CIS’s lack of institutional expe-
rience and personnel expertise in the principles and practices of liberal
markets and transnational governance in any context other than that
tions as they themselves choose. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL
GOVERNMENT (1690), available at http://www.constitution.org/jl/2ndtreat.htm.
102 See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (Univ. of Chicago Press
1962). While I critique certain points of Friedman, Friedman’s views on monetary
policy seem entirely correct to me and replaced the failed theory of John Maynard
Keynes’s “General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money.” Compare FRIED-
MAN, supra, with ERIC ENGLE, LEX NATURALIS, IUS NATURALIS 220-428 (Donna M.
Lyons & Jacob D. Zillhardt eds., 2010), available at http://tinyurl.com/
lexnaturalis, and JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, IN-
TEREST AND MONEY (1936), available at http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/
economics/keynes/general-theory/.
103 WORLD BANK, BELARUS: PRICES, MARKETS, AND ENTERPRISE REFORM 1 (1997).
104 See, e.g., id.
105 Privatization: Lessons from Russia and China - Employment Sector, INT’L LA-
BOR ORG. (Joseph Prokopenko ed.), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/
employment/ent/papers/emd24.htm (“By the beginning of 1997 the Russian econ-
omy had perhaps reached its lowest point. GNP fell by 6 percent in 1996, com-
pounding a decline of more than 50 per cent since 1991 (although the shadow
economy has expanded). Many enterprises are on the brink of collapse; the propor-
tion of loss-making enterprises in the main economic sectors is approximately 43
per cent.”).
106 See, e.g., D. A. Barr & M. G. Field, The Current State of Health Care in the
Former Soviet Union: Implications for Health Care Policy and Reform, 86 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 307, 308 (1996).
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of a single party dictatorship in turn explains the failure of the CIS
member states to have adopted EU governance models in the late
1990s.
III. CONCEPTS IN TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE
This section describes the relationships between the rule of
law, the economy, human rights protection, and democracy. It outlines
ideas about political legitimation and presents practical methods to
advance transnational relations to explain how international relations
between the United States, the E.U., and the former Soviet Republics
may be improved.
A. Historical Materialism Revisited
A key question for transnational governance is: how to untan-
gle the relationships among the rule of law, democracy, the economic
system, and human rights? The rule of law, democracy, free trade, and
human rights protection are all positively associated - improving the
protection of one tends to improve protection of the others.107 Does any
hierarchy order their relations?
I hypothesize that the rule of law is needed for an optimally
productive market economy, and that a productive economy and the
rule of law in turn lead to effective human rights protection de jure
and de facto respectively. I also argue that democratic institutions are
less important to human rights protection or to the attainment of the
rule of law than is usually thought to be the case.108 That is because,
in practice, democratic processes are used only to reinforce and legiti-
mize policies which were already formed by elites rather than to actu-
ally create public policies.109 Most legislative bills are introduced not
by democratic referenda but by elected republican representatives.
107 See, e.g., AMAZU A. ASOUZA, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND AF-
RICAN STATES: PRACTICE, PARTICIPATION AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 42
(2001); Henry J. Steiner, in Do Human Rights Require a Particular Form of De-
mocracy?, in DEMOCRACY, THE RULE OF LAW AND ISLAM 193, 202-204 (Eugene Co-
tran & Adel Omar Sherif eds., 1999); Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule
of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1 (2008).
108 See, e.g., Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 95, 96-
97 (1998).
109 EVA ETZIONI HALEVY, FRAGILE DEMOCRACY: THE USE AND ABUSE OF POWER IN
WESTERN SOCIETIES 16 (1989); DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 164 (2006);
JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 269-83 (1942);
see HARRY ECKSTEIN ET AL., CAN DEMOCRACY TAKE ROOT IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA?:
EXPLORATIONS IN STATE SOCIETY RELATIONS 134 (1998) (explaining government in-
stitutions in the context of Russia).
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Policies are typically proposed by elites110 which are then either taken
up or rejected by masses through the democratic process.111
The West tends to equate democracy with the rule of law,112
and wrongly presumes that the democratic process is necessary to the
rule of law and human rights protection.  I maintain that the rule of
law leads to a productive economy.113 The rule of law and a productive
economy together foster democratic processes and provide substantive
human rights protection. These ideas are summed up in the following
“key points”:
The rule of law is necessary for a productive open market;114
A market economy with social protections favors
prosperity;
Economic prosperity favors protection of human rights;
Democratic deficit can be ex post facto legitimized by the
success of public policies that were politically unpopular
at the time of their enactment.
110 See CHARLES WRIGHT MILLS & ALAN WOLFE, THE POWER ELITE 3-4 (2000).
111 Anne Peters argues, as does this paper, for “legitimation ex post” i.e. legitima-
tion by success. See ANNE PETERS, ELEMENTE EINER THEORIE DER VERFASSUNG
EUROPAS 517, 580 (2001); see also Andrew Arato, Dilemmas Arising from the
Power to Create Constitutions in Eastern Europe, CONSTITUTIONALISM, IDENTITY,
DIFFERENCE, AND LEGITIMACY: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 165, 186 (Michel Rosen-
feld ed., 1994); ALAN KEENAN, DEMOCRACY IN QUESTION: DEMOCRATIC OPENNESS IN
A TIME OF POLITICAL CLOSURE 28 (2003).
112 See, e.g., Richard Bellamy & Dario Castiglione, Constitutionalism and Democ-
racy - Political Theory and the American Constitution, 27 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 595
(1997).
113 David Silverstein & Daniel C. Hohler, A Rule-Of-Law Metric for Quantifying
and Assessing the Changing Legal Environment of Business, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 795,
818-19 (2010) (“For more than half a century, a prevailing view motivating West-
ern foreign aid approaches was that rule of law correlated in some positive and
significant way with economic development and an attractive business climate for
foreign investment . . . . More recent literature in this field, however, has led to
growing skepticism about the validity and general application of the assumptions
that served as the touchstones for Western development initiatives. Debate contin-
ues, for example, over whether a causal relationship between rule of law and a
successful market economy exists and, if so, in which direction that causation
runs, whether these variables may be mutually reinforcing, what key elements
characterize a rule-of-law system, and how does one explain away the many
anomalies.”)
114 See, e.g., Edgardo Buscaglia, U.N. Office for Drug Control & Crime Prevention
[UNODCCP], Ctr. for Int’l Crime Prevention [CICP], Judicial Corruption in Devel-
oping Countries: Its Causes and Economic Consequences 6-7, U.N. Doc. CICP-14
(Mar. 2001), available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/gpacpublications/
cicp14.pdf.
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Rather than adopting the position that democratic processes are either
the source of human rights protection or a necessary precondition to
the rule of law, I argue that the rule of law and economic development
positively correlate115 and that each is a precondition to effective and
meaningful human rights defense. I also argue that democratic legiti-
mation can be an outcome of economic and legal development.116
These arguments reiterate the historical materialist claims
that economic processes ultimately drive legal and ideological rational-
izations of any given political system.117 The dialectical materialist re-
finement of that argument is to note that the economic base (the forces
of production) generally determines the legal forms of the superstruc-
ture (the relations of production), but that exceptionally, at particular
times and under certain conditions, the superstructure (ideology) can
determine the base (production).118 In other words, the material forces
of production generally constitute and constrain the ideological super-
structure that rationalizes them – but, exceptionally, at certain times
and places in history, the ideological superstructure can influence and
compel the structure of the material forces of production.
Marxism aimed to act as a catalyst for the natural and inevita-
ble movement of history by intervening “at the margins,” - these excep-
115 Frank Richardson, Pro Bono Work Has Burgeoned Over the Past Few Years
Both Geographically and in Its Legal Range, 64 INT’L B. NEWS 26 (Aug. 2010) (ex-
plaining the positive correlation between rule of law and economic performance;
negative correlation between corruption and economic performance).
116 There is a plethora of literature, much of it contradictory, on the relationships
among the rule of law, prosperity, democracy, and human rights. See, e.g., Susan
D. Franck, Judicial Independence and Legal Infrastructure: Essential Partners for
Economic Development: Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration,
and Rule of Law, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DIV. L.J. 337, 342-43 (2007);
Stephan Haggard et al., The Rule of Law and Economic Development, 11 ANN.
REV. POL. SCI. 205 (2008); James R. Jones, Open Markets, Competitive Democracy,
and Transparent and Reliable Legal Systems: The Three Legs of Development, 83
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 25 (2008); Randall Peerenboom. Social Networks, Rule of Law
and Economic Growth in China: The Elusive Pursuit of the Right Combination of
Private and Public Ordering, 31GLOBAL ECON. REV. 3 (2002); John Hewko, Foreign
Direct Investment: Does the Rule of Law Matter? (Carnegie Endowment for Int’l
Peace, Democracy and Rule of Law Project, Working Paper No. 26, 2002), availa-
ble at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/wp26.pdf.
117 See generally G. A. Cohen, Base and Superstructure: A Reply to Hugh Collins, 9
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 95 (1989).
118 The dialectical relationship between the material forces of production (base)
and the ideological relations of productions (superstructure) is a basic tenet of
Marxism. See KARL MARX, Preface to A CONTRIBUTION TO THE CRITIQUE OF POLITI-
CAL ECONOMY (R. Rojas trans., Progress Publishers 1977) (1859), available at
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol-economy/preface.
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tional points in social life where superstructure can influence base.119
Perhaps the vanguard party’s altruism outran the basic needs for con-
sumption of the productive base (the workers) it was leading. Perhaps
the vanguard party became corrupted. Perhaps both explanations ap-
ply. Nevertheless, the USSR shows that vanguard parties exercising a
dictatorship on behalf of the proletariat are very effective at ending
illiteracy and starvation, and at introducing sex equality, but are not
terribly effective at coordinating production and consumption in a
complex consumer economy.120
The rule of law, economic development via free trade and open
markets, human rights protection, and democracy all correlate posi-
tively and are mutually reinforcing.121 These concepts form an interre-
lated hierarchy. I postulate their priority as follows. Without basic
laws, economic development is impossible due to physical insecurity
and legal uncertainty. Without economic development, human rights
protection is impossible or at least meaningless. Meanwhile, demo-
cratic processes require a basic legal system and at least minimal eco-
nomic well-being. Human rights protections without economic
development are sub-optimal. For example, religious freedom in the
face of starvation is merely the right to receive one’s last rites, so to
speak. While dying with dignity isn’t utterly meaningless, would it not
be better to choose life, somehow? By placing survival rights, such as
the right to food,122 ahead of psychological rights, or even political
rights, we will better protect people in real terms.
In any case, democracy, productive open markets, human rights
protection, and the rule of law are all positively correlated, and mutu-
ally reinforcing. As Russia increasingly implements the rule of law,
transaction costs will decline, which will strengthen the economy.
This, in turn, creates an environment where it is possible to envision
better human rights protections and practically apply the material re-
119 See, e.g., KARL MARX, Afterword to the Second German Edition, CAPITAL (1873);
MARX, CAPITAL, supra note 87, at ch. 24 § 1; see also FRIEDRICH ENGELS, DIALEC-
TICS OF NATURE (Andy Bluden et al. trans., 2006) (1883), available at http://
www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1883/don/index.htm.
120 See generally ENGLE, MARXISM, supra note 16.
121 See Pamela K. Star, The Two “Politics of NAFTA” in Mexico, 16 L. & BUS. REV.
AM. 839, 841 (2010) (discussing how trade liberalization, economic performance,
democratization are correlated positively); see, e.g., North American Free Trade
Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993).
122 See, e.g., Jean Ziegler, Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Economic, So-
cial and Cultural Rights: The Right to Food, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/53 (Feb. 7,
2001), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/f45e
a4df67ecca98c1256a0300340453?Opendocument (indicating that a well-function-
ing economy facilitates the furtherance of the right to eat).
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sources needed for substantive human rights protection and
enjoyment.
B. Functionalism123
Functionalism argues that institutions should be understood
and formed in terms of the functions that they aim to fulfill.124 Func-
tionalist approaches to transnational governance seek to safeguard
peace by drawing nations together,125 rather than splitting them
apart.126 Functionalism forms specialized institutions incre-
mentally127 to attain specific practical purposes.128 When functional-
ism is linked to market liberalism, it seeks to obtain peace, obviate
war, and generate prosperity and economic interdependence by delink-
123 As a theory of sociology, functionalism analogizes society to an organism, with
each member having particular functions, like organs of a body. See, e.g., Kent
McClelland, Functionalism, GRINNELL COLLEGE (Oct. 15, 2011, 12:15 PM), http://
web.grinnell.edu/courses/soc/s00/soc111-01/IntroTheories/Functionalism.html.
124 Steve Charnovitz, Triangulating The World Trade Organization, 96 AM. J.
INT’L L. 28, 48 (2002) (“The core idea of functionalism is that international govern-
ance should be organized according to ‘tasks’ and ‘functional lines.’”).
125 BARTRAM S. BROWN, THE UNITED STATES AND THE POLITICIZATION OF THE
WORLD BANK: ISSUES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 14-15 (1992) (“Function-
alism is a theory of international organization which holds that a world commu-
nity can best be achieved not by attempts at the immediate political union of
states, but by the creation of non-political international agencies dealing with spe-
cific economic, social, technical, or humanitarian functions. Functionalists assume
that economic, social and technical problems can be separated from political
problems and insulated from political pressures.”).
126 Juliet Lodge, Preface: The Challenge of the Future, in THE EUROPEAN COMMU-
NITY AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE FUTURE, at xix (Juliet Lodge ed., 2d ed. 1993)
(“The logic behind the approach is to prevent war not negatively - by keeping
states apart - but positively by engaging them in cooperative ventures . . . to estab-
lish functionally specific agencies, initially in what were then seen as non-conten-
tious areas like welfare. These were to transcend national boundaries and be
managed by rational technocrats (not swung by the vagaries of political ideology
and power-hungry political parties) owing their allegiance to a functionally spe-
cific organization not to a given nation state . . . Their tasks will cover those areas
of the economy essential to running military machines. Governments, deprived of
control over those areas, will be unable to pursue war and will eventually be left to
manage residual areas not covered by functional bodies . . .”).
127 Sabino Cassese, European Administrative Proceedings, 68 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 21, 23 (2004) (“functionalism . . . has enabled the incremental, progressive
development of the European Union”).
128 Lodge, supra note 126 (“Functionalism starts from the premise that by promot-
ing functional cooperation among states it may be possible to deter them from
settling disputes over competition for scarce resources aggressively.”).
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ing trade and territory.129 One tenet of functionalism is that economic
and political integration is best achieved not at one fell swoop with
grandiose and impossible ideas,130 but rather through incremental ef-
forts in diverse fields.131 Functionalism is realistic and pragmatic: it
seeks to attain the possible here and now rather than utopian dreams
that never really come true. Its methods obtain political legitimacy af-
ter the fact because of the success of the institution at achieving practi-
cal goals.132 Ultimately, functionalists aim to prevent war not by
keeping states apart, but by drawing them together - by establishing
transparent, responsible, and effective transnational governance
structures in specific sectors. Neo-functionalism takes functionalism
one step forward by seeking political integration.133
Just as functionalist methods were successfully applied to cre-
ate the EEC and grow them into the EU, so can they be used to build
stable prosperous transnational governance among the former Soviet
Republics, and foster the rule of law and human rights protection
through increased economic prosperity.134  Specifically, the functional-
ist method would focus on developing the idea of the rule of law in
Eastern Europe.  First is the idea of an impartial independent judici-
129 There is vast literature on functionalism. See, e.g., ERNST B. HAAS, THE UNIT-
ING OF EUROPE: POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC FORCES, 1950-57 (Stanford
Univ. Press 2004).
130 Hans J. Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law, 34
AM. J. INT’L L. 260, 283 (1940) (“Grandiose legalistic schemes purporting to solve
the ills of the world have replaced the less spectacular, painstaking search for the
actual laws and the facts underlying them.”).
131 See id. at 284.
132 Ernest A. Young, The Trouble With Global Constitutionalism, 38 TEX. INT’L
L.J. 527, 540 n.86 (2003) (“The neo-functionalist theory that has driven much of
European integration, for example, posits that supranational institutions formed
for fairly narrow purposes will attract political support over time and will thereby
be able to expand their functions.”) (citing BEN ROSAMOND, THEORIES OF EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION 51-52 (2000)).
133 Lodge, supra note 126 (“Neofunctionalists have a common starting point with
functionalists in their attachment to . . . learning processes, allegedly apolitical,
technocratic socio-economic welfare functions, consensus-building and functional
specificity, neofunctionalists adopt a pluralist perspective. They argue that com-
petitive economic and political elites mediate in the process and not only become
involved in it but become key players. . . . Neofunctional integration sees integra-
tion as a process based on spillover from one initially non-controversial, technical
sector to other sectors of possibly greater political salience, involving a gradual
reduction in the power of national government and a commensurate increase in
the ability of the centre to deal with sensitive, politically charged issues.”).
134 Jackie Gower, EC Relations with Central and Eastern Europe, in THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITY AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE FUTURE 286 (Juliet Lodge ed., St.
Martin’s Press, 2d ed. 1993).
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ary seeking to implement the national will as expressed in legislation.
Second is the idea of law as more than mere positive command, but
law also as persuasive attractive, and moral appeal. Third is the idea
of legal certainty.  This requires further construction of a but partially
existent legal culture. In Estonia, for example, Soviet era judges were
effectively shunted aside to secondary tasks, retrained, and entered
retirement or academia. New judges were selected from shockingly
young candidates.  To a much lesser extent this is also happening in
Russia. The lack of institutional retraining initiatives extending from
the United States or E.U., however, can be partly to blame. Educating
and reforming an entire legal culture is necessary, but initiatives to do
so are starkly lacking. With the formation of a neutral independent
unbiased judiciary it would then be possible to form transparent, re-
sponsible and effective institutions. A functionalist approach would
then seek to protect human rights sequentially, focusing first on sur-
vival rights, then on economic rights, progressively attaining ever
greater human rights protections: the hierarchy of norms135 to attain
the hierarchy of needs.136 I have argued elsewhere for hierarchizing
some of the basic human rights as follows: the right to one’s own life,
then the right to food,137 then the right to shelter, then political rights
and cultural rights.138 In other words, one’s basic needs in the hierar-
chy must be met before the more advanced and complex needs can be
satisfied.139 All these rights are vital to a good life, but some naturally
precede others.
From the Russian perspective, establishing a judiciary or ad-
ministrative institution is easy: The President and Prime Minister is-
sue the order. But the question is, how can Russia form an
135 See Eric Allen Engle, Universal Human Rights: A Generational History, 12
ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 219, 236 n.120 (2006), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1020464 (explaining the hierarchical evolution of human rights); see also
ENGLE, LEX NATURALIS, supra note 102 (discussing the logical hierarchization of
human rights).
136 See, e.g., JIM IFE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIAL WORK: TOWARDS RIGHTS-BASED
PRACTICE 83 (2001).
137 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 25 ¶ 1, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948), available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/
udhr/ (“Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and
well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medi-
cal care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood
in circumstances beyond his control.”).
138 AMITAVA MUKHERJEE, HUNGER: THEORY, PERSPECTIVES AND REALITY 83-84
(2002).
139 See e.g., Babu Joseph, Human Rights and Poverty: A Philosophical Perspective,
in 2 HUMAN RIGHTS AND POVERTY IN INDIA: THEORETICAL ISSUES AND EMPIRICAL
EVIDENCES 24 (S. N. Chaudhary ed., 2005).
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independent and unbiased judiciary? From the EU perspective, form-
ing judicial expertise is not difficult.  It is a matter of training in west-
ern legal methods. Joint E.U.-Russian judicial and administrative
bodies might enable the positive implementation of neutral unbiased
adjudication. EU judges would also thereby be able to compare exper-
iences, methods, and ideas with their Russian counterparts. This is to
merely indicate the extent of the problem and suggest possible ways
ahead.
C. Ex Post Legitimacy and Democratic Deficit in the EU
Democratic deficit in the EU was not an obstacle to economic
and political integration because of legitimation after the fact. As long
as processes are transparent (i.e. open, governed by the rule of law)
and not tainted with secrecy and deception (i.e. political), policies can
attain legitimacy after their implementation by virtue of their efficacy.
The EU was a long term project driven by elites with minimal
mass support.140 It was built gradually and sequentially, using the
functionalist method that focused first on aggregating the war indus-
tries, and then on dissolving national cartels by building a single inte-
grated market for goods, labor, capital, and services. The war
industries were made subject to common control not to prepare for a
war against the Soviet bloc, but to prevent yet another Western Euro-
pean War.  While NATO greatly facilitated the EU’s development by
providing a defensive umbrella under the premise of collective secur-
ity, two World Wars had already shown that collective security alone is
insufficient to prevent war.  Something beyond nation-state alliances
are necessary to achieve lasting peace. That something is economic
integration.
The EU was built without the mass public support often
thought needed for political legitimization. Despite this democratic
deficit, the EU has emerged to become one of the world’s most compe-
tent and effective transnational organizations. One lesson of the EU
for the former Soviet Republics is that the former Soviet Republics
problem of democratic governance is surmountable. We can and should
draw all the lessons from the EU’s experiences. Democratic institu-
tions in Eastern Europe can be built gradually over time using func-
tionalist methods. Transnational governance via functionalism will
generate the economic well-being necessary to create a foundation for
improved respect of human rights.
140 See, e.g., PAUL C. ADAMS, ATLANTIC REVERBERATIONS: FRENCH REPRESENTA-
TIONS OF AN AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 50 (2007) (discussing how whole
forests have been felled to rehash the famous issue of “democratic deficit”); see also
Jeffrey J. Anderson, Introduction to REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND DEMOCRACY: EX-
PANDING ON THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE 1 (Jeffrey J. Anderson ed., 1999).
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We now turn our attention to the relationship between the EU
and Eastern Europe. This will help us understand exactly how East-
ern Europe can apply EU governance models to build effective, trans-
parent participatory state systems governed by the rule of law, and
thus enjoy economic prosperity and improved human rights
protections.
IV. THE EU AND RUSSIA
“We propose the creation of a harmonious economic community
stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok” - Vladimir Putin141
The success of the EU as an example of transnational govern-
ance and the growing number of Eastern European legal scholars fa-
miliar with the basics of EU law explain the growing acceptance of the
EU in the former Soviet republics. The Russian Federation’s ultimate
long-term goal with the EU is to form an economic union to achieve
trading synergies and encourage technological innovation142 to gener-
ate economic development. Schumpeter rightly noted that innovation
generates wealth.143 EurAsEc and the EU complement each other144
because each has the same goals: to attain economic development via
free trade and to engage in economic integration to create the eco-
nomic base needed for human rights protection, to guarantee the rule
of law, and to obviate the risk of war. EurAsEc could develop indepen-
dently of the EU, but he logic of economic synergy resulting from spe-
cialization and economies of scale enjoyed as a result of free trade,
however, explains why both transnational organizations are more ef-
fective when cooperating rather than when competing with each other.
These economic benefits are further augmented by the fact that good
foreign relations means fewer resources wasted on weapons.
France’s Nicholas Sarkozy supports Russia’s desire for eco-
nomic integration with Europe, as does Italy’s Silvio Berlusconi.145 As
earlier noted, the desire for increased economic integration is partly
driven by the fact that trade between Russia and Europe is growing.
141 C. G. H., From Lisbon to Vladivostok’: Putin Envisions a Russia-EU Free Trade
Zone, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT’L (Nov. 25, 2010, 11:44 AM), http://www.spiegel.de/in-
ternational/europe/0,1518,731109,00.html.
142 Valentina Pop, Putin Proposes Russia-EU Union, EU OBSERVER (Nov. 26,
2010, 09:29 AM), http://euobserver.com/19/31361.
143 JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 154 (Redvers
Opie trans., 1934).
144 European Parliament Resolution of 17 June 2010 on the Conclusions of the
EU/Russia Summit (31 May – 1 June 2010), 2011 O.J. (C 236 E/103) para. 1, avail-
able at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2011:236E:
0101:0104:EN:PDF [hereinafter EU/Russia Summit].
145 See, e.g., Berlusconi Wants EU-Russia Visa Tegime to be Scrapped, RIANOVOSTI
(Apr. 18, 2008, 7:25 PM), http://en.rian.ru/world/20080418/105424007.html.
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This growing trade reflects Russia’s comparative advantage in hydro-
carbons146 and, to a lesser extent, atomic energy. This growing trade
also reflects the asymmetric European comparative advantage in cer-
tain industrial goods. Though Western Europe is even more dependent
than the U.S. on imported petroleum, alternatives exist to Russian
natural gas. Solar energy has become much more efficient in the past
decades.147 Wind turbines, too, are increasingly competitive. Though
Germany largely rejects atomic energy148 for environmental reasons,
France uses it extensively.149 It is even possible, albeit expensive, to
liquefy coal into petroleum products.150 Likewise, ethanol has been
used successfully in Brazil as an alternative automotive fuel.151 Thus,
the energy dependence on petroleum imports of countries such as the
United States or Germany is only relative. Russian energy exports are
driven not by geopolitical ambitions, but by the practical fact of who
146 Balance Human Rights & Energy with Russia Says Knut Fleckenstein MEP,
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (June 23, 2010, 2:52 PM), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
sides/getDoc.do?language=EN&type=IM-PRESS&reference=20100618STO76329
(“The European Union’s relationship with Russia is one of its most important and
most complicated. Strong trade and energy ties bind both although many in the
EU are concerned about Moscow’s human rights record.”).
147 FEDERAL MINISTRY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, NATURE CONSERVATION AND NU-
CLEAR SAFETY, RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES IN FIGURES 8 (2010), available at
http://www.erneuerbare-energien.de/files/english/pdf/application/pdf/broschuere_
ee_zahlen_en_bf.pdf (“The expansion of renewable energy sources in Germany has
been an exemplary success. Since 2000, renewable energies’ contribution to final
energy supply has increased 2.5-fold to a level of 10.3 %. In the electricity sector,
the German Government had originally aimed to achieve a 12.5 % renewables’
share of gross electricity demand by 2010. This target was already surpassed, con-
siderably, by 2007. In 2009, a share of over 16% had been reached.”).
148 Eben Harrell, Germany Decides to Extend Nuclear Power, TIME (Sept. 6, 2010,
7:38 AM), http://ecocentric.blogs.time.com/2010/09/06/germany-decides-to-extend-
nuclear-power/ (“Every [sic] since Chernobyl puffed its radioactive plume over Eu-
rope in 1986, Germany has been deeply suspicious of nuclear power. Opposition to
Atomkraft is at the center of the country’s green movement, and almost a decade
ago the country decided to phase out its nuclear plants by 2021.”).
149 Nuclear Power in France, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N (Oct. 15, 2011, 12:35 PM),
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf40.html (“France derives over 75% of its elec-
tricity from nuclear energy. This is due to a long-standing policy based on energy
security.”).
150 Sasol’s Synthetic Fuels Go Global, S. AFRICA INFO (Mar. 16, 2007), http://
www.southafrica.info/business/ success/sasol-130307.htm.
151 Larry Rohter, With Big Boost from Sugar Cane, Brazil Is Satisfying its Fuel
Needs, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2006),  http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/10/world/
americas/10brazil.html?_r=1&pagewanted=1&sq=Bush%20Brazil%20ethanol&
st=nyt&scp=5.
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will pay the most.152 Recall that, during the Cold War, the USSR did
not participate in the Arab oil embargos and continued to sell petro-
leum to the U.S.153 This experience demonstrates that energy issues
are not determinative of foreign relations between the Russian Feder-
ation and other states, but merely constrain outcomes because of the
fact that energy dependence is relative, not absolute. While the impor-
tance of those economic relationships is obvious, they are not the EU’s
primary legal concern. Nor are these economic relationships the driv-
ing force of efforts toward Russia’s de jure economic integration into
the EU or the WTO. Meanwhile, de facto economic integration is, and
will continue to further deepen regardless of political issues because of
practical economic facts.
Mutual economic interests between the EU and Russia are
leading to de facto economic integration. Europe is dependent on Rus-
sian primary resources and exchanges them for investments into Rus-
sia’s secondary and tertiary markets.154 This creates conditions under
which the rule of law is likely to be increasingly respected because 1)
Increasing wealth makes rule breaking less frequent due to reduced
desperation; 2) Foreign investors do not wish to see their economic in-
terests nationalized and foster the rule of law through private contrac-
tual mechanisms such as jurisdiction and binding arbitration clauses;
and 3) International commerce requires legal stability so that con-
tracts clear quickly and efficiently, thus incentivizing the Russian ju-
diciary to professionalism. This extensive wealth creation in turn
indirectly makes the real protection of human rights much likelier in
practice. I argue that de jure economic integration will accelerate the
inevitable process of de facto economic integration and help contribute
to the formation of the rule of law in the former Soviet Republics, at
least in an exemplary fashion, though hopefully also through forma-
tion of institutions and comparison of expertise.
What about human rights? Often people think of the false di-
chotomy: “either the market or human rights.” In fact, trade leads to
prosperity resulting in better human rights protection.155 Trade also
152 MARSHALL GOLDMAN, PETROSTATE: PUTIN, POWER AND THE NEW RUSSIA 136-70
(Oxford Univ. Press 2010).
153 Dina R. Spechler & Martin C. Spechler, The Soviet Union and the Oil Weapon:
Benefits and Dilemmas, in THE LIMITS TO POWER: SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE
EAST 96, 96-98 (Yaacov Ro’i ed., 1979).
154 See, e.g., Europe and Russia’s Resources: “We Are Mutually Dependent on Each
Other”, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT’L (July 14, 2006), http://www.spiegel.de/international/
spiegel/0,1518,426555,00.html.
155 See, e.g., Ce´line Charve´riat & Romain Benicchio, Trade and Human Rights:
Friends or Foes?, in PEACE AND PROSPERITY THROUGH WORLD TRADE 279 (Fabrice
Lehmann & Jean-Pierre Lehmann eds., 2010); Craig Forcese, Human Rights
Mean Business: Broadening the Canadian Approach to Business and Human
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leads to interdependence, making war unprofitable. Accordingly, the
EU seeks to create an open integrated market with the Russian Feder-
ation. Both partners desire increased integration because the EU is
Russia’s main trading partner156 and because the level of trade be-
tween the EU and Russia continues to rapidly grow.157
Key institutions created to channel EU-Russia relations in-
clude the EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (“PCA”),
the four “common spaces” pursuant to the PCA, and the Northern Di-
mension. Finally, to understand how the EU relates to other former
Soviet Republics that are not EU Member States, we must also under-
stand the EU’s Eastern Partnership program.
A. The EU’s Concerns with respect to the Russian Federation
To understand the relations between the EU and the Russian
Federation, we must understand the perceptions of the EU toward the
Russian Federation. The issues that cause concern among the EU’s
leadership or its citizens with respect to the Russian Federation are
political, economic, and legal in nature. This section briefly summa-
rizes the EU’s position on all three issues to show how they, albeit
discretely, interact to a significant degree. Ultimately, this section il-
lustrates how the EU and Russia are moving closer to each other  in
the post-Soviet era.
Rights, in GIVING MEANING TO ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 74 (Isfa-
han Merali & Valerie Oosterveld eds., 2001); ADAM GEAREY, GLOBALIZATION AND
LAW: TRADE, RIGHTS, WAR 133 (2005).
156 Directorate-General for Trade, Trade: Russia (Bilateral relations), EUROPEAN
COMM’N (Oct. 7, 2011), http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-
relations/countries/russia/index_en.htm  (“The EU is by far Russia’s main trading
partner, accounting for 52.3% of its overall trade turnover in 2008. It is also by far
the most important investor in Russia.”).
157 Press Releases, European Union, Review of Russia-EU Relations (Nov. 5,
2008) http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/678&
format= (“Trade and investment between the EU and Russia are substantial and
growing, and it is in our mutual interest that this trend should continue. Russia is
our third most important trading partner and we see growth rates of up to 20%
every year. Energy is a major factor, but impressive growth figures have also been
seen in services. With its sustained high growth rates and emerging middle class,
Russia is an important emerging market on our doorstep that offers opportunities
to EU enterprises. The EU is the major investor in Russia, accounting for 80% of
cumulative foreign investment.”) [hereinafter Russia-EU Relations].
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1. Political Concerns
Politically, the EU’s concerns with respect to the Russian Fed-
eration go to questions of the rule of law, democracy,158 and human
rights protection.159
As to the rule of law, a Russian procedural rule of law state
enables construction of durable and predictable legal institutions,
rather than uncertain political ones, with the aim of transforming
zero-sum political interactions into positive-sum economic interac-
tions. Corruption in the domestic governance of the Russian Federa-
tion is a substantive problem for Russia’s relationship with the EU
because it threatens the security of economic relations160 and under-
mines protection of human rights.
The EU’s desire to foster democracy, in turn, is not merely an
issue of the legitimacy of state power. The existence of democratic in-
stitutions is also taken – to some extent erroneously – as evidence or
guarantor of the rule of law.161 The EU’s concern with democracy in
158 European External Action Service, Freedom, Security and Justice, EUROPEAN
UNION (Oct. 15, 2011, 4:50 PM), http://www.eeas.europa.eu/russia/com-
mon_spaces/fsj_en.htm (“The EU has supported the development of democracy,
the protection of human rights and the development of a healthy civil society in
Russia notably through the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights
(EIDHR).”) [hereinafter Freedom, Security and Justice].
159 With democracy, respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule
of law an essential element of EU-Russia relations, it is only natural that these
issues are regularly discussed at all levels. In 2005 regular, six-monthly EU-Rus-
sia human rights consultations were established. They have provided for a sub-
stantial dialogue on human rights issues in Russia and the EU and on EU-
Russian cooperation on human rights issues in international fora. The EU also
maintains a regular dialogue with both Russian and international NGOs on
human rights issues. Issues that the EU raises with Russia in the human rights
consultations include: the human rights situation in Chechnya and the rest of the
North Caucasus, including torture and ill-treatment; freedom of expression and
assembly, including freedom of the media; the situation of civil society in Russia,
notably in light of the laws on NGOs and extremist activities; the functioning of
the judiciary, including independence issues; the observation of human rights
standards by law enforcement officials; racism and xenophobia; legislation relat-
ing to elections. For its part the Russian side raises matters of concern to it in
developments inside the EU. Id. (“The EU has supported the development of
democracy.”).
160 European Union Action Plan on Common Action for the Russian Federation on
Combating Organised Crime, 2000 O.J. (C 106/5) 1, available at http://eur-lex.eu-
ropa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2000:106:0005:0012:EN:PDF.
161 EU/Russia Summit, supra note 144, at para. 1 (“[the EU] [r]eaffirms its belief
that Russia remains one of the EU’s most important partners in building long-
term cooperation and a commitment to working together to address common chal-
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the Russian Federation162 can be seen as a proxy for concerns about
the rule of law.163 However, equating democracy and the rule of law –
and they do correlate – means that failure to attain the former is seen,
wrongly, as necessarily, i.e. inevitably, impinging on attainment of the
latter, and this can prevent progress. The rule of law is a precondition
to stable business relations, in turn generating prosperity164 and leads
to effective human rights protection.165 Democratic legitimation can
thus be obtained after the fact and is not a necessary, indispensable
precondition to improving human well-being in real terms.
lenges by means of a balanced, results-oriented approach based on democracy and
the rule of law.”).
162 See, e.g., Maria Elena Efthymiou, Fact Sheets on the European Union: Russian
Federation, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.europarl.europa.
eu/parliament/expert/displayFtu.do?language=EN&id=73&ftuId=FTU_6.4.2.html
(“The fundamental values and principles of democracy, human rights, the rule of
law and the market economy underpin the EU-Russia bilateral relationship and
its legal basis, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). Russia and the
EU are committed to work together to combat new threats to international secur-
ity, such as terrorism, organised crime, illegal migration and trafficking in people
as well as drugs.”).
163 See, e.g., EU/Russia Summit, supra note 144, at para. F (“whereas, as a mem-
ber of the Council of Europe and of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE), Russia has committed itself to protect and promote human
rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, and to respect the sovereignty of
its European neighbours; whereas EU-Russia relations have faced a number of
serious challenges over the last few years, notably as regards concerns about de-
mocracy and human rights in Russia”).
164 Cf. Smock, Kozlovsky on Russia’s Failed Democracy, BOYCOTTSOCHI.EU (Nov.
24, 2009), http://boycottsochi.eu/breaking-human-rights/401-kozlovsky-on-russias-
failed-democracy (reviewing Oleg Kozlovsky, Russia: Lessons of Russia’s Failed
Liberalization, in 20 YEARS AGO, 20 YEARS AHEAD: YOUNG LIBERAL IDEAS (Ulrich
Niemann & Neli Kaloyanova eds., 2009)) (“Property rights are not guaranteed and
can easily be violated via the corrupt police, courts and other government agen-
cies. As a result, free markets cannot function and the best competitor is not the
most efficient but the one with the best connections.”). While I respectfully think
Mr. Kozlovsky overstates the case, his identification of the rule of law as a needed
precondition to the most productive open market economy is accurate. However, I
argue that even a corrupt yet productive economy will generate improved human
rights protection and the rule of law indirectly over time, but not as rapidly as a
“clean” economy would. Corruption is a significant transaction cost and a source of
inefficiency.
165 Cf. Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013: Russian Federation, EUROPEAN UNION,
at 3 (2007), http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/russia/docs/2007-2013_en.pdf
(“The EU places emphasis on the promotion of democracy, the rule of law and good
governance in general, as well as respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms.”).
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Open governance institutions and processes are needed for the
economy;166  the rule of law is also crucial for human rights protec-
tion.167 Poverty resulting from legal uncertainty and corruption
reduces the real level of human rights protection and the legitimacy of
Russian democracy.168
The relationships between the rule of law, a productive econ-
omy (which results from an open market, free trade, and the rule of
law), democracy, and the attainment of human rights are mutually
reinforcing and intertwined in complex ways   They are, however, all
positively associated: improvement in one tends to encourage improve-
ment in the others.
2. Economic Concerns
As mentioned earlier, the economic context of Russian-EU
trade can be summed up as “raw materials for finished goods,” a nor-
mal pattern of trade between developed and developing countries.169
In other words, the EU and the Russian Federation have an economic
relationship based on interdependence. Nevertheless, Russian-EU
166 See Sergei Guriev, Tackling Corruption in the Russian Economy,
OPENDEMOCRACY.NET (Nov. 12, 2009), http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/
sergei-guriev/tackling-corruption-in-russian-economy (“Growth requires specific
economic institutions: the protection of ownership rights and of competition, the
fulfillment of contracts (i.e. an independent and effective court system.”).
167 Cf. Murad Tangiev, Political Leadership and Transitional Democracy in the
Russian Federation: Challenges and Prospects, 11 J. PEACE CONFLICT & DEV. 3
(2007) (“Democracy and human rights are considered to be fundamental prerequi-
sites for a [sic] sustainable development and long-term peace.”).
168 See, e.g., Jonathan D. Weiler, Human Rights in Post-Soviet Russia, DEMOKRA-
TIZATSIYA (Spring 2002), available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3996/
is_200204/ai_n9062371/ (“declining state capacity, fiscal austerity, and growing
social inequality, characteristic features of many of the new democracies, translate
into gross violations of the rights of socially vulnerable groups.”).
169 See EU-Russia Energy Relations, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Sept. 13, 2011),  http://
ec.europa.eu/energy/international/russia/russia_ en.htm (“The Russian Federation
is the 3rd biggest world trade partner of the EU. Energy represents 65% of total
EU imports from Russia. Russia is the biggest oil, gas, uranium and coal exporter
to the EU. In 2007, 44.5% of total EU’s gas imports (150bcm), 33.05% of total EU’s
crude oil imports, and 26% of total EU coal imports came from Russia. In total,
around 24% of total EU gas sources are originating from Russia. In general, en-
ergy dependency varies significantly between different Member States / regions in
the EU. The EU is by far the largest trade partner of the Russian Federation: 45%
of Russia imports originate from the EU, and 55% of its exports go to the EU,
including 88% of Russia’s total oil exports, 70% of its gas exports and 50% of its
coal exports. The export of raw materials to the EU represents around 40% of the
Russian budget, and the EU represents 80% of cumulative foreign investments in
Russia.”).
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trade has not, to present, coalesced into a binding legal document or
relationship170 beyond the existing partnership and cooperation
agreement.
The key to peace and prosperity in the war 21st century is eco-
nomic interdependence rather than isolation. Trading states have a
strong incentive to renounce war against each other.171 For example,
the United States, unlike the EU, does not trade heavily with the Rus-
sian Federation.172 Perhaps as a consequence, U.S. analysts seem to
overemphasize security aspects of the West’s relationship with
Russia.173
170 See id. (“[F]ollowing the gas crisis from 2009, it is essential to reinforce mutual
confidence and to establish a strong and stable legal framework for EU-Russia
energy relations.”).
171 PAUL D’ANIERI, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: POWER AND PURPOSE IN GLOBAL AF-
FAIRS 184 (2d ed. 2010); see BRINK LINDSEY, AGAINST THE DEAD HAND: THE UNCER-
TAIN STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM 71 (2002).
172 Russia, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Aug. 30, 2011), http://
www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/europe-middle-east/russia-and-eurasia/russia
(“Russia is currently our 24th largest goods trading partner with $31.7 billion in
total (two way) goods trade during 2010. Goods exports totaled $6.0 billion; Goods
imports totaled $25.7 billion. The U.S. goods trade deficit with Russia was $19.7
billion in 2010.  Russia was the United States’ 37th largest goods export market in
2010 U.S. goods exports to Russia in 2010 were $6.0 billion, up 11.9 percent ($636
million) from 2009.”); Trade in Goods with Russia, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, available
at http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c4621.html#2010 (showing data
that in 2010 the U.S. exported but 6.0064 billion dollars of goods to Russia and
imported only 25.6910 billion dollars of goods from Russia.).
173 See, e.g., NORMAN A. GRAEBNER, RICHARD DEAN BURNS & JOSEPH M. SIRACUSA,
REAGAN, BUSH, GORBACHEV: REVISITING THE END OF THE COLD WAR 2, 47 (2008);
John Prados, A World of Secrets: Intelligence and Counterintelligence, in THE CEN-
TRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY: SECURITY UNDER SCRUTINY 143 (Athan G. Theoharis
et al. eds., 2006) (explaining that errors in U.S. analysis of Russian capabilities
and intentions are a fairly consistent historical fact). See generally Eric Engle, Be-
yond Sovereignty? The State After the Failure of Sovereignty, 15 ILSA J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 1 (2008); Engle, Europe Deciphered, supra note 2; Engle, The Transfor-
mation, supra note 51; Eric Engle, Working Paper, Contemporary Legal Thought
in International Law: A Synopsis (2010), http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/
orgs/hela/working%20papers/2010/EngleContemporaryLegalThought.doc (ex-
plaining that this results from 1) individualist method which does not consider
historical tendencies of groups 2) presuming the opponent has the same exper-
iences and objectives (failure in opponent modeling) 3) presuming the opponent is
an (implacable) adversary and cannot be a partner. These sorts of errors are the
result of applying the outmoded realist state centric view of the world to interna-
tional relations).
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3. Legal Concerns
The EU’s legal concerns with Russia touch a myriad of issues.
This section covers only some of the most salient ones. One concern is
criminality,174 which includes arms and drug trafficking.175 Human
migration is also a concern, with fears that Russian workers might
flood European labor markets.176These fears, however, are not partic-
ularly realistic. Most people are not criminals, and most criminals are
eventually caught. The EU’s eastward expansion did not lead to the
flooding of Western European labor markets with cheap Eastern la-
bor.177 Western European fears of a flood of Eastern European work-
ers have shown themselves to be unrealistic and overstated.178  Like
most modern industrialized countries, the Russian Federation faces
net labor inflows rather than outflows.179 In fact, about ten million
foreigners, mostly from China and Northern Korea, work in the Rus-
174 See Matthew Day, EU Immigration Fears over Polish Visa Deal with Russia,
THE INDEPENDENT.IE (Dec. 28, 2010), http://www.independent.ie/world-news/eu-
rope/eu-immigration-fears-over-polish-visa-deal-with-russia-2475682.html  (“Po-
land is pushing for citizens of the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad to have visa-free
travel, despite fears this could increase smuggling and illegal migration into the
European Union.”).
175 Cf. Freedom, Security and Justice, supra note 158 (“Our cooperation contrib-
utes to the objective of building a new Europe without dividing lines and facilitat-
ing travel between all Europeans while creating conditions for effectively fighting
illegal migration. Moreover, the EU has a considerable interest in strengthening
cooperation with Russia by jointly addressing common challenges such as or-
ganised crime, terrorism and other illegal activities of cross-border nature.”).
176 Russia-EU summit: Is Russia Part of Europe?, RIANOVOSTI (June 2, 2010, 5:04
PM), http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20100602/159271440.html (“The visa barrier be-
tween the EU and its eastern neighbors has been growing stronger since the 1990s
as a result of Europe’s fear of a wave of poor immigrants from the East. As it turns
out, this fear was unjustified. Even after Poland joined the EU and all restrictions
on Polish immigration were lifted, Poles continued to immigrate to other European
countries legally for jobs they had already secured and with enough travel money
in their pockets.  There was no wave of immigrants from Belarus, Ukraine or Rus-




179 Russia to Announce Amnesty for Millions of Illegal Guest-Workers, RUSS. DAILY
NEWS INFO. SERV. (Sept. 13, 2011), http://www.english-to-russian-translation.com/
russian-translation-news-091105.html (“The chairman of the Federal Migration
Service said that there were up to 15 million illegal workers living in present-day
Russia. About 80 percent of them come from the countries of the former USSR.”).
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sian Federation, most of them illegally.180 Thus, Russian-EU economic
integration will not cause a flood of Russian labor into the EU.
The aforementioned political, economic and legal concerns re-
turn us to the question of the relationships between the rule of law,
democracy, the economic system, and human rights – questions to
which we now focus our attention.
B. The EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)
The EU and the Russian Federation aim to create an open inte-
grated market. Just as the EU created a single integrated market in
order to generate prosperity and interdependence to obviate and avert
war, so too do the EU and Russian Federation seek to create an inte-
grated market.181 This open and integrated market is to be attained
via the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which is the princi-
pal legal instrument governing EU-Russia relations.182 The EU also
uses PCAs to relate to several other former Soviet Republics.183 The
PCAs seek, via functionalist incrementalism, to create over time the
same base found in the EU: a customs union featuring the free move-
ment of goods and capital, the right to establish enterprises, and even-
tually to include the exchange of professional services and workers.184
The EU-Russia PCA forms the basis of the four “common
spaces” between the EU and the Russian Federation185 resulting in an
180 Russia Cracking Down on Illegal Migrants, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2007), http://
www.nytimes.com/2007/01/15/world/europe/15iht-migrate.4211072.html.
181 EU-Russia Common Spaces Progress Report 2009, EUROPEAN COMM’N (Mar.
2010), at 5, available at http://www.st-gaterus.eu/_media/commonspaces_prog_re-
port_2009_en.pdf (“The overall objective of the Common Economic Space is the
creation of an open and integrated market between the EU and Russia.”) [herein-
after Progress Report].
182 See Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation Establishing a Partnership
Between the European Communities and their Member States, of One Part, and
the Russian Federation, of the Other Part, 2007 O.J. (L 327), available at http://
eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:21997A1128(01):EN:
HTML.
183 See Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs): Russia, Eastern Europe,
the Southern Caucuses and Central Asia, EUROPEAN UNION (Sept. 29, 2010), http://
europa.eu/legislation_summaries/external_relations/relations_with_third_coun-
tries/eastern_europe_and_central_asia/r17002_en.htm (showing that the EU has
signed PCAs with almost all of the former Soviet Republics).
184 Id.
185 JOSEPH FRANCOIS & MIRIAM MANCHIN, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF A POTENTIAL FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT (FTA) BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE COMMON-
WEALTH OF THE INDEPENDENT STATES 102 (CASE Network Reports, ENEPO Pro-
ject, No. 84/2009), available at http://www.case-research.eu/upload/publikacja_
plik/23704363_CNR_84_final.pdf. (“The Partnership and Co-operation Agreement
(PCA) which entered into force in 1997 has been the framework of the EU-Russia
588 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 10:4
effective institutional framework functioning through the Permanent
Partnership Council.186 At the 2003 Petersburg Summit, the EU and
Russia agreed to strengthen cooperation by creating four “common
spaces” in the framework of the Partnership and Cooperation Agree-
ment.187 These are:
1. The Common Economic Space, covering economic is-
sues and the environment;
2. The Common Space of Freedom, Security and
Justice;
3. The Common Space of External Security, including
crisis management and non-proliferation; and
4. The Common Space of Research and Education, in-
cluding cultural aspects.
This approach parallels the “pillar” structure that was one aspect of
the EU prior to the Lisbon Treaty. The Russian Federation wants to be
treated as an equal partner to the EU. Thus, a pillar approach, rather
than the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), was established. The
pillar approach, however, in fact parallels the ENP approach:188
1. Common economic space
The essence of the European Union is a “single integrated mar-
ket.” The EU-Russian common economic spaces seek to attain “an
open integrated market.” Formation of the common economic space re-
relationship for a decade. The agreement regulates the political, economic and cul-
tural relations between the EU and Russia and is the legal basis for the EU’s
bilateral trade with Russia. In 2003 the EU and Russia agreed to create four EU-
Russia “common spaces”, within the framework of the existing Partnership and
Co-operation Agreement (PCA). The Common Economic Space (CES) aims at in-
creasing economic cooperation with creating grounds for establishing a more open
and integrated market between the EU and Russia.”).
186 Russia-EU Relations, supra note 157 (“EU-Russia relations are based on the
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in force since 1997, which was fur-
ther complemented by the Four Common Spaces in 2005. This results in an insti-
tutional framework which in many respects works well, particularly at political
level [sic] through the Cooperation Council (now Permanent Partnership Council
in Foreign Ministers’ format).”).
187 European External Action Service, EU-Russia Common Spaces, EUROPEAN
UNION (Aug. 29, 2011), http://www.eeas.europa.eu/russia/common_spaces/index_
en.htm.
188 Commission Report Reviews Progress Under EU-Russia Common Spaces, N.
DIMENSION P’SHIP IN PUB. HEALTH AND SOC. WELL-BEING (Apr. 23, 2010), http://
www.enpi-info.eu/maineast.php?id=21349&id_type=1&lang_id=450 (“Russia is
not part of the European Neighbourhood Policy.  Its relationship with the EU is
defined as a Strategic Partnership, consistent with the ENP but evolving along
different lines.”).
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quires the “gradual approximation of legislation.”189 Legal harmoniza-
tion is one means to the end of improving the rule of law in Russia.
Legal harmonization increases legal certainty and reduces transaction
costs as do the suppression of tariff barriers, quantitative restrictions,
and legal provisions with similar effect.
2. Common Space on Freedom, Security and Justice
This common space essentially governs police cooperation.190
Here, the EU addresses its concerns earlier mentioned of criminal-
ity.191 The essence of this common space is cooperative and largely a
political, rather than legal, arrangement. Regarding travel freedoms,
travel to and from Russia is still generally subject to visas. Second is
the ongoing concern of unauthorized migration. As to security, the cen-
tral focuses are countering the problems of crime and terrorism. As to
justice, the primary human rights issues involve press freedoms and
overreactions against terrorism by the Russian State, and secondarily
is the concern with ultra-nationalist violence.192
3. Common Space on External Security
This common space parallels the former common foreign and
security policy (CFSP) pillar of the EU.193 The goals here are non-
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (especially nuclear weap-
ons), anti-terrorism collaboration, and EU-Russia security coopera-
tion. Today, the EU and the Russian Federation cooperate militarily in
189 European External Action Service, Common Economic Space, EUROPEAN
UNION (Aug. 29, 2011), http://www.eeas.europa.eu/russia/common_spaces/
economic_en.htm.
190 Freedom, Security and Justice, supra note 158 (“The EU and Russia agreed at
the St. Petersburg Summit of May 2003 to create in the long-term a ‘Common
Space on Freedom, Security and Justice’. A road map agreed in 2005 sets out the
objectives and areas for cooperation in the short and medium term. Its gradual
development takes place in the framework of the Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement.”).
191 Id. (“Our cooperation contributes to the objective of building a new Europe
without dividing lines and facilitating travel between all Europeans while creating
conditions for effectively fighting illegal migration. Moreover, the EU has a consid-
erable interest in strengthening cooperation with Russia by jointly addressing
common challenges such as organised crime, terrorism and other illegal activities
of cross-border nature.”).
192 See generally Progress Report, supra note 181, at 41-43.
193 European External Action Services, External Security, EUROPEAN UNION (Aug.
29, 2011), http://www.eeas.europa.eu/russia/common_spaces/external_security_en.
htm  (“The EU and Russia have agreed to reinforce their cooperation in the area of
external security. . . ”).
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certain peacekeeping missions in Africa pursuant to the common space
of external security.
4. Common Space of Research and Education, Including Cultural
Aspects
This common space seeks to foster intellectual exchanges and
encourage scientific and technical innovation as a key contributor to
economic growth.194 From the Russian perspective, it involves devel-
oping the Skolkovo research and industrial park, which is considered
the Russian Silicon Valley.195
C. The Northern Dimension
The Northern Dimension’s objective is to promote environmen-
tally sustainable development throughout the region.196 It is a re-
gional political framework established to govern the Baltic and Arctic
regions.197 Most notably, it focuses on environmental pollution and
cleanup issues that particularly concern radioactive waste198 resulting
from the decommissioning of Soviet-era nuclear vessels, and related
issues such as health and maritime transit.199 The Northern Dimen-
sion’s objective is to promote environmentally sustainable develop-
ment throughout the region.200
194 European External Action Services, Research and Development, Education,
Culture, EUROPEAN UNION (Aug. 29, 2011), http://www.eeas.europa.eu/russia/com-
mon_spaces/research_en.htm (“In the area of research and development the objec-
tive is to enhance EU-Russia cooperation in mutually agreed priority fields. . . ”).
195 Russia to Spend $132 Million on Skolkovo Research Hub in 2010, RIA NOVOSTI
(Aug. 29, 2010, 19:29), http://en.rian.ru/business/20100729/159987299.html.
196 NDPHS - About NDPHS - Background, Mission, Priorities, Strategy, Actors
and Activities, N. DIMENSION P’SHIP IN PUB. HEALTH AND SOC. WELL-BEING (Aug.
29, 2011), http://www.ndphs.org/?about_ndphs (“The mission of the NDPHS is to
promote the sustainable development of the Northern Dimension area by improv-
ing peoples’ health and social well-being.”).
197 European External Action Services, European Union: Northern Dimension,
EUROPEAN UNION (Aug. 29, 2011), http://ec.europa.eu/delegations/russia/eu_rus-
sia/fields_cooperation/regional_issues/northern_dimension/index_en.htm (“The
Northern Dimension Policy of the European Union answers to the EU’s intensive
cross-border relations with Russia in the Baltic Sea and Arctic Sea regions.”).
198 Id.
199 European External Actions Services, Northern Dimension, EUROPEAN UNION
(Aug. 29, 2011), http://eeas.europa.eu/north_dim/  (“To facilitate project implemen-
tation within the framework of the ND policy, partnerships on the following issues
were created: the environment (NDEP), public health and social wellbeing
(NDPHS), culture (NDPC) and transport and logistics (NDPTL).”).
200 NDPHS - About NDPHS - Background, Mission, Priorities, Strategy, Actors
and Activities, N. DIMENSION P’SHIP IN PUB. HEALTH AND SOC. WELL-BEING (Aug.
29, 2011), http://www.ndphs.org/?about_ndphs (“The mission of the NDPHS is to
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D. The Eastern Partnership
The EU frames its relations with the Ukraine, Moldova, and
the Caucasian republics within its Eastern Partnership framework.201
The Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit
stated that “[t]he main goal of the Eastern Partnership is to create the
necessary conditions to accelerate political association and further eco-
nomic integration between the European Union and interested part-
ner countries.”202 To attain this goal of open borders and economic
integration to foster economic development and ultimately political
stability, the respect of human rights, and the rule of law, “[t]he Euro-
pean Commission proposed a ‘differentiated, progressive, and
benchmarked approach’ to the new neighbors which was specified in
the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) Strategy paper.”203 To pro-
mote this strategy, the EU has jointly mobilized aid and trade as re-
wards for the attainment of the rule of law and human rights
protections to EU standards.204
Both Russia and the EU have sometimes perceived the Eastern
Partnership as a point of contention between the EU and the Russian
Federation. Each side inaccurately perceived the other as trying to
carve out “spheres of influence” to “freeze out” the other.205  The obsta-
promote the sustainable development of the Northern Dimension area by improv-
ing peoples’ health and social well-being.”).
201 See European External Action Services, Eastern Partnership, EUROPEAN
UNION (Aug. 29, 2011), http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/index_en.htm (“The Euro-
pean Commission put forward concrete ideas for enhancing our relationship with:
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. This would imply
new association agreements including deep and comprehensive free trade agree-
ments with those countries willing and able to enter into a deeper engagement and
gradual integration in the EU economy.”).
202 Press Release, Council of the European Union, Joint Declaration of the Prague
Eastern Partnership Summit (May 7, 2009), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=PRES/09/78&format=HTML&aged=0&lan-
guage=EN&guiLanguage=EN.
203 FRANCOIS & MANCHIN, supra note 185, at 9.
204 See, e.g., European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument: Georgia, Na-
tional Indicative Programme 2007-2010, EUROPEAN COMM’N 4 (Sept. 13, 2011),
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_csp_nip_georgia_en.pdf.
205 See, e.g., Motion for a Resolution on the EU-Russia Summit, COM (2010) B7-
0297 (June 9, 2010), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?
type=MOTION&reference=B7-2010-0297&language=EN (“whereas there is a la-
tent dispute between the EU and Russia on creating spheres of influence in the
common neighbourhood; whereas this competition prevents the solution of frozen
conflicts and risks to create new one’s; whereas the European Union and the Rus-
sian Federation could and should play together an active role in promoting peace
and stability in the common neighbourhood,”); Pop, supra note 142; Andrew Wil-
son et al., The Future of EU-Russia Relations, EUR. PARL. 15-16 (2009), http://
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cles that had been hindering improved economic integration, however,
will be increasingly surmounted by visionary leadership in the EU,
Russia, and the other former Soviet Republics. This is because of in-
creased transnational institutional awareness and improved mutual
understanding. Most importantly, it is also because of the mutual rec-
ognition that EU cooperation with the formation of EU-modeled trans-
national governance in the Russian Federation and the former Soviet
Republics is complementary and not conflicting.
E. WTO Accession
The EU views Russia’s accession to the WTO as a means of
achieving the end  of increased prosperity through freer trade, and the
construction of legal institutions as the formation of a Russian rule of
law state.206 The United States shares this view.207 For its part, the
Russian Federation wishes to join the WTO208 and coordinates its ac-
cession with EurAsEC209 and the EU210 toward that goal. This paper
www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/pe407011en_wil-
sonpopes/pe407011en_wilsonpopescu.pdf.
206 EU/Russia Summit, supra note 144, at para. G (“whereas Russia’s accession to
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) would make a substantial contribution to
further improving economic relations between the EU and Russia, subject to a
binding commitment on Russia’s part to full compliance with and implementation
of WTO undertakings and obligations, and would pave the way for a far-reaching,
comprehensive economic integration agreement between the two partners on the
basis of genuine reciprocity, and whereas Russia established a customs union with
Kazakhstan and Belarus on 1 January 2010”).
207 2007 EU-U.S. Summit Promoting Peace, Human Rights and Democracy
Worldwide, EUROPEAN UNION 2 (2007), http://www.eeas.europa.eu/us/sum04_07/
statement_political_security_issues.pdf (“We note the importance of our relation-
ship with Russia. A stable, prosperous and democratic Russia remains in our com-
mon interest. We seek in our relations with Russia to promote common values
such as political pluralism, the rule of law, and human rights, including freedom of
media, expression and assembly, and note our concerns in these areas. We will
continue to work with Russia in areas of mutual interest, including non-prolifera-
tion, counterterrorism, energy security and regional issues, such as the resolution
of frozen conflicts. We will also continue to work with Russia towards its accession
to the World Trade Organization.”).
208 Events: Russia’s WTO Accession is Our Foreign Economic Policy Priority – Dep-
uty Prime Minister Alexander Zhukov, OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE GOV’T OF THE
RUSS. FED’N (Dec. 1, 2010), http://government.ru/eng/docs/13142/ (“Russia’s WTO
accession is our foreign economic policy priority.”).
209 Prime Minister Vladimir Putin Meets with Representatives of the German Busi-
ness Community, OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE GOV’T OF THE RUSS. FED’N (Nov. 26,
2010), http://premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/13120/ (“We believe that we have
come close to meeting every requirement for this. Moreover, I can tell you that, as
our negotiators report, in practical terms we have agreed, at least with the Euro-
2011] FROM RUSSIA WITH LOVE 593
argues that free trade leads to specialization and economies of scale,
and that the rule of law increases legal certainty and reduces transac-
tion costs. This in turn leads to increased prosperity and the reduced
likelihood of war. The EU and EurAsEc are aiming to achieve the
same goals of greater prosperity and political security through free
trade. Thus, the EU and EurAsEc are not in conflict, but rather com-
pliment each other.211 The WTO extends the logic of free trade as the
path to peace and prosperity to the global level.212 It is therefore desir-
able for the Russian Federation to join the WTO, since joining will
both reflect and increase acceptance by the West of the Russian Feder-
ation’s economic growth and future potential. Political issues appear to
have needlessly hindered that economic process.
Following derailment of Russia’s WTO accession process be-
cause of its 2008 war with Georgia, the Russian Federation is now
back on track to conclude its accession to the WTO Treaty.213 The EU
pean Union (EU), on every major issue. I hope that we will document this in the
near future. And, finally I’d like to comment on an issue that is worrying many
people. I’m referring to our Customs Union, which is to be followed by the Common
Economic Space (CES), and that will mean further integration with Belarus and
Kazakhstan. I see here a lot of my acquaintances and even friends. And this is
what I want to tell you: I think you should be grateful to us for our enormous and
complicated work on coordinating the positions of our partners from Belarus and
Kazakhstan. . . . the process of coordinating those positions, which are almost
identical to WTO rules, was indeed complicated and exhausting. This means that
our partners in Europe . . . will be able to work, in the near future, both in Belarus
and in Kazakhstan by nearly common rules, rules that are very close to WTO re-
quirements. If you study in detail what we are negotiating, you will see that there
are practically no deviations from WTO rules.”).
210 Press Release, European Union, Joint Statement of the Delegations of the Rus-
sian Federation and of European Union on the Occasion of the Conclusion of the
Bilateral Talks on the Key Issues in the Accession of the Russian Federation to the
WTO (Nov. 24, 2010), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference=IP/10/1599&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=EN
[hereinafter Joint Statement on Russia] (“Both sides are confident that this agree-
ment will greatly facilitate the overall process of accession of Russia to the WTO.”).
211 EU/Russia Summit, supra note 144, at para. G.
212 The 10 Benefits: 1. Peace, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Feb. 6, 2011), http://
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/10ben_e/10b01_e.htm; see also Compara-
tive Advantage, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Aug. 22, 2011), http://www.wto.org/english/
res_e/reser_e/cadv_e.htm; DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECON-
OMY AND TAXATION 7.13-7.16 (Library of Econ. & Liberty 1999) (1817); ADAM
SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 3
(Univ. of Chi. Press 1976) (1776) (noting an example of increased production in a
pin factory due to specialization).
213 See Joint Statement on Russia, supra note 210 (“Both sides are confident that
this agreement will greatly facilitate the overall process of accession of Russia to
the WTO, and they re-affirm their shared commitment to continue working in a
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and Russia appear to have worked out their differences214 and are pre-
pared to see the Russian Federation join the WTO.215 Both the EU and
the Russian Federation consider Russian participation in the WTO as
desirable since it creates new economic opportunities on both sides of
the ledger.216 Russian adhesion to the WTO should not be impeded by
Russia’s existing free trade with areas such as EurAsEC.217 The bot-
tom line: Russia and the EU need each other, and the United States
should foster that process as part of globalization because it will lead
to greater stability and productivity for all.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has argued that the Russian Federation and other
former Soviet Republics can apply EU governance models in their rela-
tions with each other, and with the EU. To make that case, this paper
constructive and co-operative spirit on the remaining questions in this multilat-
eral process to achieve this goal as soon as possible.”).
214 Lyudmila Alexandrova, No Key Differences Left at Russia’s Talks on WTO
Membership, THE ORG. OF ASIA-PACIFIC NEWS AGENCIES (Nov. 27, 2010), http://
www.oananews.org/view.php?id=143824.
215 Russia to Sign WTO Accession Document with EU Next Week - EU Official,
RIA Novosti: JOHNSON’S RUSSIA LIST (Nov. 29, 2010), http://www.cdi.org/russia/
johnson/russia-wto-europe-nov-366.cfm.
216 See Joint Statement on Russia, supra note 210 (“Both sides stressed their
strong expectation that the rapid accession of Russia to the WTO will greatly con-
tribute to the opening of new opportunities to do business with and in Russia and
strengthen the international competitiveness of the Russian economy by
harmonising its economic regime with global trading rules.”).
217 See Roberts & Wehrheim, supra note 52, at 316 (“Normally, setting up a cus-
toms union or free trade area would violate the WTO’s ‘most-favoured-nation’ prin-
ciple which assures equal treatment for all trading partners. However, three WTO
articles provide derogations from this principle. Article XXIV of the GATT (com-
plemented by an ‘Ad Art XXlV’, and updated by the 1994 Understanding) allows
regional trading arrangements to be set up under certain conditions. Article XXIV
contains the primary provisions covering customs unions (CUs), free trade areas
(FTAs) and interim trade agreements (necessary for the formation of CUs and
FTAs). It is based on four main criteria: Duties and other restrictive regulations of
commerce must be eliminated (XXlV:8) on ‘substantially all trade’ between constit-
uent territories of a customs union or free trade area. Interim arrangements lead-
ing to the formation of a free trade area or customs union should exceed ten years
only in exceptional circumstances. Furthermore, Article V of the General Agree-
ment on Trade in Services allows WTO members to sign regional agreements on
services provided that such agreements have substantial sectoral coverage, elimi-
nate existing discriminatory measures and/or prohibit new or more discriminatory
measures. Finally, the ‘Enabling Clause’ allows derogations from the most-
favoured nation treatment principle in favour of developing countries and permits
preferential arrangements among developing countries in goods trade.”).
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compared the objectives and institutional structure of the USSR, the
EU, and the CIS. The USSR and EU both tried to react to the problem
of war to obtain the best standard of living possible for their people.
Nevertheless, they pursued these objectives in radically different man-
ners. Recognizing that both the USSR and EU shared common goals
helps us to contextualize the USSR’s collapse and the CIS’ failure. It
also enables us to propose workable governance models based on the
EU’s extensive historical experiences in transnational governance.
Such institutions and rules can serve as a basis for the formation of
the rule of law in Eastern Europe that, in turn, will generate economic
prosperity, especially through trade liberalization. This will conse-
quently improve the real protection of basic human rights in the region
and make conflict less likely. Understanding the mutually reinforcing
character of a market economy, the rule of law, and human rights pro-
tection enables all actors to pursue the best rules and processes to ob-
tain optimal outcomes for all. Common teleologies, coupled with
conflicting methods of competing governance models contextualize his-
torical experiences: understanding these broad tendencies enables mu-
tual understanding, and enables us to build bridges instead of walls.
